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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Money laundering is a practice ‘as old as money itself’.1 In 1931, after the conviction of Al 
Capone for tax evasion, there was a noticeable trend in the use various methods to 
camouflage assets deriving from crimes.2 Indeed, the practice of money laundering became 
not only more prevalent, but also more detectable.3 However, the term “money laundering” 
was used for the first time in connection with the Watergate Scandal in the United States, 
when the Republican Party channelled money obtained illegally via Mexican banks to fund 
its election campaign. In 1986, the US Congress adopted the Money Laundering Control Act 
to criminalise money laundering.4 The US recognised that, having an international character, 
money laundering could not be combated with domestic laws and controls alone, and that, 
being the only country implementing strict regulations, the US had placed itself in an 
economically disadvantageous position.5 Therefore, the US brought the issue of money 
laundering to the attention of the international community. Given the then prevailing 
                                                     
1 Muller WH ‘Anti-Money Laundering- A Short History’ in Muller WH, Kalin CH, Goldsworth JG Anti-Money 
Laundering: International Law and Practice (2007) 3. 
2 Zwick M Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering (2003) 36. 
3 Financial intelligence allowed authorities and financial institutions to observe acts and attempts at 
laundering. See Zwick (2013) 36. 
4 Madinger (2016) 24. 
5 Mugarura N The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in Less Developed Countries (eds) 
(2016) 14. 
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international concern about the growing trade in illicit narcotic drugs, states started to 
become increasingly aware of the need to combat money laundering.6 
In simple terms, money laundering means turning dirty money into clean money to outwit 
the authorities and enjoy the proceeds of crimes.7 Criminals conceal the illicit source of 
proceeds of crimes to avoid investigation and prosecution. 
Money laundering is kick-started by the commission of predicate offences such as bribery, 
grand corruption, human trafficking, drug dealing, trafficking in human organs and tax 
evasion, amongst others.8 Whereas some countries identify in their laws specific offences as 
predicate offences of money laundering, others make all crimes predicate offences. 
Successful laundering enables criminals to reap huge profits from their criminal activities.9 It 
also boosts illicit financial flows (IFFs).10 The fact of the matter is that money laundering has 
severe adverse effects on financial markets and creates economic distortion.11 It results in 
reputational damage to countries and their financial institutions (FIs).12 Consequently, the 
global economy is hindered, development impeded, and the well-being of society affected. 
                                                     
6 Pieth M & Aiolfi GA Comparative Guide to Anti-Money (2004) xvii. 
7 Zwick (2003) 36. 
8 Madinger J Money Laundering: A Guide For Criminal Investigators (2011) 13. 
9 Reuter P ‘How Much Money Is Laundered?’ in Reuter P Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money 
Laundering (2004) 35. 
10 Illicit financial flows are defined as “money illegally earned, transferred or used.” OECD Illicit Financial 
Flows from Developing Countries: Measuring OECD Responses (2014). 
11 Trillions of dollars are lost to criminals because of IFFs. See Global Financial Integrity Illicit Financial 
Flows: The Most Damaging Economic Condition Facing the Developing World (2015) 134. The African 
continent, for example, loses more than USD 50 billion every year in IFFs. See The Guardian ‘Africa 
Losing Billions from Fraud and Tax Avoidance’ 2 February 2015. 
12 McDowell J & Novis G ‘The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime’ Economic 
Perspectives An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State 6 (2001) 6-8. 
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Therefore, it is critically important to combat money laundering.13 In fact, the enactment 
and implementation of anti-money laundering (AML) legislation by countries have become a 
matter of priority over the past two decades.14 Following the tragic events of the 9/11 
attacks in the US, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is the international body that 
sets AML standards with which countries are expected to comply, added another nine extra 
Recommendations aimed at combating the financing of terrorism (CFT).15 With time, 
countries have developed their AML/CFT regime. 
The AML/CFT regime is comprised of two distinct but complementary laws, namely, the 
preventive laws and the enforcement laws.16 The preventive body of laws are meant to 
regulates the procedures that need to be implemented as prophylactic measures to prevent 
the crime of money laundering. The body of laws that regulate the enforcement aspect is 
aimed at punishing the crime of money laundering. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Notwithstanding the extensive AML/CFT measures that exist at both international and 
domestic level, money laundering and IFFs continue to occur.17 
                                                     
13 McDowell (2001) 8. 
14 Global Financial Integrity (2015) 138. 
15 Remarks of Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, ACAMS AML and 
Financial Crimes Conference, Hollywood Florida, 12 April 2016. 
16 See generally Reuter P ‘Anti-Money Laundering Regime’ in Reuter P Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight 
against Money Laundering (2004) 44-49. See also Goredema C ‘Measuring Money Laundering in 
Southern Africa’ 14 (2005) African Security Review 29. 
17 Reuter (2004) 23-24. 
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Essentially, money laundering is a vicious circle, as the more the money that is laundered 
the more opportunity criminals have of investing their ill-gotten gains in more profit-
generating crimes. The enablers of money laundering are, amongst others, service 
providers18 and professionals.19 The booming offshore financing centres (OFCs) operate in a 
thick shroud of secrecy and allow investors to conduct business in jurisdictions with less 
restrictive laws and lighter tax burdens.20 In fact, offshore bank accounts hold an estimated 
USD 21 trillion,21 and the number of complex structures, including shell companies and 
offshore banking corporations spread across several countries, is difficult to establish.22 
More notably, people may invest their money with the help of intermediaries, designated 
non-financial businesses and professionals (DNFBPs). Not surprisingly, money laundering is 
considered to be main conduct responsible for the abuse of the global financial system.23 
Thus, services provided by OFCs and DNFBPs are at high risk of being abused by money 
launderers. 
The 2016 Panama Papers Leak revealed secretive financial information on 140 current and 
former politicians and public officials, including their relatives and close friends, who used 
                                                     
18 According to the Thabo Mbeki Foundation, the bulk of illicit money is channelled through service 
providers in international tax havens. AfricaRenewal Online Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Track It, 
Stop It, Get It (2013). 
19 Reuter (2004) 35-37. Lawyers and accountants have been named the gatekeepers and facilitators of 
money laundering and fall under the category of designated non-financial businesses and professionals. 
See generally FATF Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 
(2013) 24-27. 
20 Komisar L ‘Funny Money: Enron and Al Qaida Share Offshore Banking Tactics’ Metroactive News & 
Issues (2002). 
21 Frederick E ‘Allen Super Rich Hide $21 Trillion Offshore, Study Says’ Forbes 23 July 2012. 
22 Rettig CP ‘The Panama Papers and Lessons Learned from Years of Offshore Leaks’ (2016) Journal of Tax 
Practice & Procedure 30. 
23 Reuter (2004) 171. 
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the services provided by OFCs and the help of DNFBPs to allegedly hide assets worth 
billions.24 These people fall under the general definition of politically exposed persons 
(PEPs), who, because of their status as, for example, public officials or heads of state, or 
because of their associations with the latter, are at high risk of engaging in illegal activities.25 
In fact, bribery and corruption are those predicate offences of money laundering which 
involve PEPs and abundant amounts of money and large scale operations. These crimes 
cause severe harm to developing countries and are primarily, but not exclusively, prevalent 
in poor countries.26 High-ranking public officials are thus capable of abusing their influential 
positions to commit economic crimes and to conceal their ill-gotten wealth in the global 
financial system.27 Additionally, the political power wielded by PEPs or their ability to reach 
out to others who have political sway enables them to gain access to public funds or to 
benefit unlawfully from insider information.28 They may (mis)use financial vehicles to 
launder money ‘earned’ from other predicate offences such as unfair allocation of contracts, 
dissemination of insider information and the crime of embezzlement. Not surprisingly, the 
FATF considers them as a special category of customers and advocates that FIs and DNFBPs 
adopt a risk-based approach (RBA) in conducting customer due diligence (CDD), and 
enhanced due diligence (EDD) measures before entering into business transactions with 
                                                     
24 Rettig (2016) 29. 
25 Hopton D Money Laundering: A Concise Guide for All Business (2006) 93. 
26 Reuter (2004) 41-42. 
27 Mugurara (2016) 151.  
28 Patel H and Thakkar BS Money Laundering Among Globalised World in Globalisation: Approaches to 
Diversity (2012) 169. 
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them.29 Therefore, FIs and DNFBPs are required to submit also suspicious transaction 
reports (STRs) to Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) where they suspect that transactions are 
irregular and might constitute acts of money laundering.30 The FATF recommends also that 
FIs and DNFBPs become fully acquainted with their clients and that they apply ongoing the 
Know-Your-Client (KYC) procedures when dealing with their customers.31 In fact, a 2012 
survey found that identifying whether a potential client is a PEP or not is the main factor 
considered by FIs during the risk assessment of client relationships.32  
A holistic approach has been used on a multilateral level to fight money laundering and its 
predicate offences, and to identify and closely monitor offshore, as well as domestic 
holdings and transactions by PEPs. However, many cases involving criminal and unethical 
conduct of PEPs have been found and many more are believed to be occurring secretly. 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
In addition, to the previously mentioned economic and social costs of money laundering, 
criminal conduct on the part of PEPs victimises the whole population as this kind of 
unlawfully obtained wealth usually derives from state funds, meaning tax payers’ money.33 
The delinquent behaviour of PEPs reduces also public confidence in the government and it 
erodes public trust in state departments while also affecting negatively the quality of public 
                                                     
29 Recommendations 1, 10, 12, 20 and 22 of the FATF. 
30 Recommendations of 10, 12, 20 and 22 of the FATF. 
31 Recommendations 10 and 12 of the FATF. 
32  KPMG Africa Anti-Money Laundering Survey 2012 (2013). 
33 Hopton (2006) 93. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 17 
 
services. Moreover, a failure of institutions to deter, detect, and sanction attempts and acts 
of money laundering, especially the ones involving PEPs, may lead to reputational damage 
of its FIs and OFC, and to sanctions being imposed at the behest of international regulatory 
bodies. Non-compliance with AML standards may further endanger the economic stability of 
a country, erode public confidence in the banking system, and promote an informal 
economy and unregulated banking system. This necessarily affects the well-being of society 
and the economic development and sustainable growth of countries. More importantly, 
non-compliance leads also to the increased commission of economic crimes resulting from 
the abuse of office.34 
Mauritius is a popular tax haven that has entered into many double tax agreements with 
other countries.35 The country is becoming the Indian Ocean’s financial hub.36 Strategically 
located between Africa and Asia, it is the gateway to Africa and to the African economy. 
Thus, the services provided by its OFC risk being exploited for money laundering purposes. 
The country’s economy relies on foreign direct investments and on the performance of its 
FIs. Moreover, as it is, numerous cases of money laundering related to Mauritius have been 
detected; this state of affairs has tarnished the country’s reputation. What is more, the 
country has to deal with cases of internal money laundering, incoming money laundering, 
and outgoing money laundering by PEPs.37 
                                                     
34 Ogbodo UK & Mieseigha EG ‘The Economic Implications of Money Laundering in Nigeria International’ 3 
(2013) Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences 173-177. 
35 Mauritius has concluded 43 tax treaties and is party to a series of treaties under negotiation. See 
Mauritius Revenue Authority ‘Double Taxation Agreements’. 
36 AfricaMoney ‘The Mauritius International Financial Centre: A Credible Transparent and Cooperative 
Financial Hub’. 
37 These cases are discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 18 
 
It bears noting that, although the financing of terrorism is closely related to money 
laundering, this study will not deal issues of terrorism, as the bulk of the literature on PEPs 
shows that they are associated more with the laundering of money for personal 
enrichment.38 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
This research paper will delve into how some PEPs take advantage of their public office or 
their association with public officials to commit economic crimes such as money laundering. 
It will explore further the two pillars of the AML regime: the prevention pillar and the 
enforcement pillar while highlighting the measures recommended by the FATF and those 
instituted by FIs to minimise the money laundering risks posed by PEPs. After sketching the 
existing Mauritian AML measures, this study will investigate to what extent these measures, 
constituting the two AML pillars, are in fact being implemented in relation to PEPs in 
Mauritius.  
1.5 Methodology 
This paper is a pure desktop study which is based on primary sources such as conventions, 
international instruments, and parliamentary debates. It is informed also by various 
secondary sources such as books, journals, and electronic sources. 
1.6 Chapter Outline 
This paper is divided into four chapters. This chapter has introduced the topic and sketched 
the consequences of money laundering.  
                                                     
38 Hopton (2006) 3. 
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Chapter Two gives an overview of what money laundering is, how the act of laundering is 
executed, and which techniques are used to commit the crime. It explains also the concept 
of PEP and the ambiguities surrounding it. Finally, it explores the twin AML pillars discussed 
above and how they relate to PEPs. 
Chapter Three gives an overview of Mauritius and its financial system. It explains the money 
laundering risks the country faces, with a special focus on those pertaining to PEPs. 
Moreover, it explores the legal and regulatory measures in so far as they apply to PEPs and 
evaluates them against the template of international standards. 
Chapter Four concludes the study and formulates recommendations that are meant 
especially for Mauritius.
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 20 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
KEY CONCEPTS 
 
2.1 Key Concepts of Money Laundering and Politically Exposed Persons 
2.1.1 Concept of Money Laundering 
Around four thousand years ago, merchants in China used to hide their earnings, move 
them, and re-invest them in businesses within provinces and outside China to prevent rulers 
from taking a share of the money.1 This is the basic concept of money laundering and it 
evidences how old this practice is. However, as mentioned earlier, the term ‘money 
laundering’ came into use much later.2 Some writers claim that the latter dates back to the 
1920s when gangsters such as Al Capone in Chicago in the US opened laundromats as fronts 
to disguise the criminal origin of their wealth.3 Others state that the term appeared in print 
for the first time during the 1973 Watergate Scandal4 when the British newspaper, The 
Guardian, used it to describe the manner in which the Republican Party in the US used 
Mexican banks to channel campaign funds back to the US.5 Even though scholars cannot 
                                                     
1 Madinger (2011) 4. See also Sullivan K Anti-Money Laundering In A Nutshell: Awareness and Compliance 
for Financial Personnel and Business Managers (2015) 1. 
2 Madinger (2011) 11. 
3 Unger B Implementing Money Laundering in Masciandaro D, Takats E & Unger B Black Finance: The 
Economics of Money Laundering (2007) 103. 
4 Richards JR Transnational Criminal Organisations, Cybercrime, and Money Laundering: A Handbook for 
Law Enforcement Officers, Auditors, and Financial Investigators (1998) 43. See also Mugarura (2016) 
135. 
5 Mugarura (2016) 135. 
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ascertain the exact origins of the term, ‘money laundering’ has become the common 
appellation for the act of disguising criminal property.6 
2.1.1.1 Money Laundering from the Technical Perspective 
Money laundering is a sophisticated term for a fundamentally simple concept.7 Money 
laundering is described variously in literature, the simplest definition being turning dirty 
money into clean money.8 Money laundering is described also as a process through which 
the illegal source of assets can be concealed and legitimised.9  
A common feature in all definitions is the movement of illicit assets into the financial 
system. More precisely, there are three fundamental elements used in the technical 
definition of money laundering: the illicit wealth generated by criminal activities; the aim of 
the process, which is to legitimise the illicit wealth to avoid prosecution and confiscation of 
criminal proceeds; and finally, the different mechanisms of doing so, which include 
placement, layering and integration. 
Therefore, the basic act of money laundering consists of hiding, moving and investing ill-
gotten assets for the purpose of concealment. Indeed, the ultimate aim of launderers is to 
legitimise the funds and use them again.  
                                                     
6 Ogbodo & Mieseigha (2013) 170. 
7 Schott PA Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (2006) 
1. 
8 Zwick (2003) 36. 
9 Ogbodo & Mieseigha (2013) 171. 
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2.1.1.2 Money Laundering from the Legal Perspective 
Conventions, agreements, laws and regulations use different elements to construct the legal 
definition and the crime of money laundering. Firstly, the subject of money laundering 
differs across jurisdictions. While some of them consider only financial revenues as the 
subject of money laundering, others apply a broader approach and take different kinds of 
assets into consideration.10 
Secondly, some national legal frameworks consider the purpose of money laundering to be 
that of concealment of the illegal source of proceeds. Yet, other countries, like Switzerland, 
consider its purpose to be that of avoiding criminal investigation and prosecution.11  
Finally, there are different perspectives regarding what should be considered as the source 
of proceeds. Undoubtedly, some jurisdictions take the view that the source must constitute 
a serious crime; others recognise the proceeds stemming from any illegal activity as a 
possible source of what can be laundered.12 In fact, the scope of predicate offences of 
money laundering varies. Some countries adopt the ‘all crimes’ approach; others list the 
predicate crimes; yet others adopt the threshold approach. The FATF leaves it to the 
discretion of countries to choose which approach to adopt.13 The 1988 United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance (the Vienna 
                                                     
10 For instance, on the one hand, the Austrian Penal Code uses use the term ‘parts of wealth’ while the 
Swiss Penal Code uses ‘assets’ to describe the subject. The Institute of Criminology Research and Public 
Policy Series (1996), on the other hand, describes it as ‘proceeds’. Yet, the term ‘property’ is used by the 
United Nations Law Model for Money Laundering (2003). See Unger (2007) 112-114. 
11 Unger (2007) 114. 
12 Ogbodo & Mieseigha (2013) 171. 
13 Recommendation 3 of the FATF. See also FATF Interpretive Note to Recommendation 3 (Money 
Laundering Offence) (2012) 34-35. 
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Convention)14 limits the scope of predicate offences to those that are drug-related.15 Other 
international and regional instruments call for an extended scope, which considers all 
serious offences under national laws.16 However, seen in relation to the type of punishment 
a crime attracts, the notion of ‘serious’ is relative. For example, in Switzerland, a serious 
crime is one for which a sentence of more than one year may be imposed.17 In other 
countries, a serious crime might be classified as one for which a mandatory minimum prison 
sentence, which could be years, is prescribed. 
To sum up here, there is no universal definition of money laundering. Although, the acts 
constituting the crime are fundamentally the same, the working definition and the degree of 
criminalisation is not uniform. These differences create some ambiguity when it comes to 
transnational investigation of money laundering cases, prosecution and modes of assets 
recovery.18 
2.1.1.3 Dimensions of Money Laundering 
The literature distinguishes between various forms of money laundering, namely:  
                                                     
14 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, opened 
for signature in December 1988 and entered into force in November 1990. 
15 Article 3(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention. 
16 These instruments include: (a) the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force; (b) the 2005 
United Nations Convention against Corruption; (c) the 2001 United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime; (d) the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime; and (e) the European Community Directives 1991, 
2001, and 2005 91/308/EEC on the Prevention of the Use of Financial Institution for the Purpose of 
Money Laundering. 
17 Unger (2007) 117. 
18 For example, conflicts occur when country A seeks to recover assets laundered in country B whose law 
does not provide for the predicate offence in respect which country A seeks to recover the laundered 
assets. See Unger (2007) 104. 
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(i) Internal money laundering, by which is meant that the predicate offence and the 
conduct of laundering are committed in the same country; 
(ii) Incoming money laundering, which is understood to mean that the predicate 
offence is committed outside a country, but where the proceeds of the crime are 
thereafter introduced into the country; 
(iii) Outgoing money laundering, by which is comprehended that the predicate 
offence is committed in a country and the proceeds of the crime are laundered in 
a foreign country. 
2.1.2 Concept of Politically Exposed Persons 
FIs treat PEPs as ‘special’ clients, given the potential risks associated with them.19 However, 
a review and analysis of the different laws and regulations across jurisdictions shows that, 
despite the wide use of the term and much concern associated with it, there is no 
universally accepted definition of the term PEP.20 
In June 2003, the FATF issued mandatory requirements pertaining to foreign PEPs, their 
family members and close associates, but encouraged member states to extend these to 
domestic PEPs.21 The updated FATF Recommendations on PEPs has a broader approach.22 It 
uses the same definition as Article 52 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
                                                     
19 FATF Guidance Paper: Politically Exposed Persons (Recommendations 12 and 22) (2013) 3. 
20 Patel & Thakkar (2012) 169. 
21 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 3. 
22 Recommendation 12 of the FATF. See FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 4-5. 
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(UNCAC) and includes both domestic PEPs (DPEPs) and PEPs of international organisations.23 
The FATF defines PEPs as: 
‘individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public functions and 
their family members and close associates.’24 
The FATF Interpretive Note to Recommendation 12 recommends that countries extend the 
definition of PEPs to ‘persons with prominent public functions’, including heads of state, 
senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, and senior executives of 
state-owned corporations and important political party officials.25 The FATF states that 
business relationships with family members or close friends of PEPs involve similar risks for 
FIs as those by PEPs themselves.26 However, it bears highlighting that this definition is not 
intended to cover middle-ranked or junior public individuals.27 
Moreover, on the one hand, some standard setters attempt to define PEPs with reference 
to a list of positions they occupy and, on the other hand, others are more flexible and allow 
                                                     
23 UNCAC was adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 2005. It is the major international anti-corruption 
instrument setting the minimum anti-corruption standard for countries to follow and improve upon. 
With the aim of effectively fighting corruption in general and its inchoate offences in particular, UNCAC 
provides for prevention, criminalisation, international co-operation and asset recovery measures. 
24 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 4-5. 
25 Whether a person is a domestic or a foreign PEP depends on which country has entrusted the person 
with the prominent public function. The country of domicile of a person or his nationality does not 
determine the type of PEP, but these factors have to be considered when determining the level of risk 
associated with PEP. It has to be highlighted that, in most cases, foreign PEPs (FPEPs) are higher-risk 
clients than DPEPs. Additionally, it should be noted that a DPEP is subject to the requirements of FPEPs 
if the person is also a FPEP by virtue of another prominent public function exercised in another country. 
See FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 4, 5 and 19. 
26 Gordon (2011) 4-5. Recommendation 12 of the FATF. FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 4, 12-14. 
27 FATF (2013) 5. 
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a wider interpretation of the term.28 For example, some definitions focus mostly on FPEPs or 
on DPEPs, while others include family members, close associates and high-ranked PEPs, 
thereby excluding other family relatives, friends, lower-ranked PEPs and middle-ranked 
PEPs.29 
The definition of PEP set out in the Third European Union Money Laundering Directive 
(Third EU Directive) is similar to the one by the 2006 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group 
(JMLSG).30 This definition states that PEPs are: 
‘natural persons who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions 
and immediate family members, or persons known to be close associates, of such 
persons.'31 
The Third EU Directive does not use the terms DPEP or FPEP specifically, but it states the 
specific procedures and measures to be used in relation to PEPs residing outside the 
jurisdiction and those who might reside within the jurisdiction but have public functions 
overseas.  
The Wolfsberg Global Anti-money Laundering Guidelines for Private Banking of 2012 define 
PEPs as: 
‘individuals holding or, as appropriate, having held, senior, prominent, or 
important public positions with substantial authority over policy, operations or 
the use or allocation of government-owned resources, such as senior government 
                                                     
28 Oji RO ‘Implications of Politically Exposed Persons Participation in 2015 Elections in Nigeria 
Mediterranean’ Journal of Social Science 5 (2014) 209. 
29 Oji (2014) 208. 
30 Choo KR ‘Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs): Risks and Mitigation’ Journal of Money Laundering Control 
11 (2008) 372. 
31 Article 3 of the Third EU Directive 2005/60/EC on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for 
the Purpose of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.  
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officials, senior executives of government corporations, senior politicians, 
important political party officials, etc., as well as their close family and close 
associates. PEPs from different jurisdictions may be subject to different levels of 
diligence.’32 
The Wolfsberg Guidelines highlight that a financial institution should not disregard a client’s 
former position or associations and that these factors are relevant when deciding whether 
the person is a PEP or not.33 The guidelines emphasise also the importance of identifying 
and distinguishing between DPEPs and FPEPs.34 
Furthermore, some standards setters have extended the definition of a PEP to add other 
categories of persons.35 These include high-ranking officials of international and 
supranational organisations such as the UN, or the World Bank, members of ruling royal 
families with governance responsibilities, and members of central banks, public 
associations, religious groups and public enterprises, as well as senior members of the 
diplomatic corps, political parties and armed forces.36 Nonetheless, the guidelines state that 
some of these PEPs may be excluded during risk-based due diligence procedures.37 
                                                     
32 Wolfsberg Global Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Private Banking (2012) 5. 
33 See generally Wolfsberg Global Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Private Banking (2012). 
34 Whether a person is a DPEP or a FPEP depends on which country has entrusted the person with the 
prominent public function. The country of domicile of a person or his nationality does not determine the 
type of PEP, but these factors have to be considered when determining the level of risk associated with 
a PEP. It has to be highlighted that, in most cases, FPEPs are higher-risk clients than DPEPs. Additionally, 
it should be noted that a DPEP is subject to the requirements of FPEPs if the person is also a foreign PEP 
through another prominent public function in another country. Recommendation 12. FATF Guidance 
Paper (2013) 4, 5 and 19. 
35 Recommendation 12 of the FATF. FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 3, 4, 8, 19, and 23. 
36 Wolfsberg Frequently Asked Questions on Politically Exposed Persons (2008) 2-5. 
37 Wolfsberg (2008) 2-5. 
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2.1.2.1 Family Members and Close Associates 
The FATF recommends that the requirements in relation to PEPs should be applied also to 
their family members who are related to a PEP either directly through consanguinity, or 
through marriage or similar civil forms of partnership, and to close associates, who are 
individuals closely connected to a PEP, either socially or professionally.38 However, the FATF 
does not define clearly the terms ‘family members’ or ‘close associates’. In fact, it is difficult 
to do so, as the scope of these terms depends on the socio-economic and cultural factors of 
the country of the PEP. For instance, in some cultures the circle of family members is closed 
and includes, for example, parents, spouses, partners, and children; in others grandparents, 
grandchildren and cousins could be considered family members.39 Moreover, the social, 
economic and cultural factors determine also how close the relationships of close associates 
are. Additionally, the people who qualify under this categorisation are not ‘fixed’ or 
permanent; they change with time and circumstances. Some examples of close associates 
include known girlfriends, boyfriends, mistresses, prominent members of the same political 
party or organisation as the PEP; and business partners or associates, especially those who 
share beneficial ownership of legal entities with the PEP, or who have joint membership on 
a company board of directors.40  
                                                     
38 Recommendation 12 of the FATF. 
39 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 12. 
40 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 13. 
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2.1.2.2 Time Limit of a PEP Status 
Apart from the fundamental definition, there are other issues surrounding the 
categorisation of individuals as PEPs. The duration for which an individual is to be 
considered as PEP is one such example. There is no agreement as regards the latter point. 
Time limits are not imposed by either the FATF or UNCAC.41 The Wolfsberg Guidelines 
highlight that the former position and associations of potential or existing clients’ should not 
be disregarded and are relevant when deciding whether or not to designate a person as a 
PEP.42 
The risks associated with PEPs emanate mainly from their public function or their current 
social status and surrounding. However, it is undeniable that PEPs might have lifelong direct 
or indirect influence or access to insider information, bringing them within the compass of 
risks of committing the predicate offences and the offence of money laundering. The risks 
associated with PEPs are thus ongoing risks.43 
Categorising potential clients and consistently conducting EDD on PEP clients has serious 
implications for FIs.44 For instance, the former might imply the opportunity cost of not 
engaging in business with them, while the latter involves the human and time resources 
used to check clients’ files and status, which might affect the relationship between the FI 
and the client. However, this does not mean that designated PEPs should not benefit from 
services offered by FIs, nor does it imply that they should be categorised as such forever.  
                                                     
41 Greenberg TS et al. Politically Exposed Persons: Preventive Measures for the Banking Sector (2010) 31. 
42 Wolfsberg Global Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Private Banking (2012) 5. 
43 Patel & Thakkar (2012) 169. 
44 Recommendation 12 of the FATF. 
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In fact, the de-categorisation of an individual as a PEP is possible. However, this should not 
be automatic or linked to only one factor. For example, de-categorisation of a person should 
not occur as the individual leaves his public function, stops carrying out his mandate as a 
minister, or gets divorced from a PEP. The risk management system of the FIs should 
investigate and monitor the status of the client and his source of wealth and income.45 The 
approval of senior management should be sought before the de-categorisation.46 These 
measures are necessary because the wrong de-categorisation of a PEP may result in 
increased risks for the FIs in the sense that engaging in business with PEPs and lax CDD 
involve reputational, administrative and criminal sanctions arising from both the national 
and the international AML/CFT regimes regulating FIs.47 
2.1.2.3 Identifying Politically Exposed Persons 
Compliance and risk analysing officers use many tools to identify PEPs. For example, they 
take into account local knowledge or intelligence about business development, commercial 
PEP database providers, asset and income declaration filing lists, information available in 
the media and the internet, and search engines are used.48 Furthermore, public records are 
used to verify the information provided by clients and cross-check the owners, directors, 
partners or any other person associated with a company.49  
                                                     
45 Recommendation 12 (a), (c), and (d) of the FATF. See Greenberg (2010) 31. 
46 Recommendation 12 (b) of the FATF. See Greenberg (2010) 31. 
47 Greenberg (2010) 31. 
48  See generally FATF Guidance Paper (2013) Part V: Guidance on the Use of Sources of Information for the 
Determination of PEPs, Their Family Members and Close Associates 13-18. 
49 Hopton (2006) 94. 
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The FATF recommends that FIs should have a risk management system and adequate 
internal controls, and that their employees should receive ongoing training programmes, 
inter alia, to identify PEPs.50 However, FIs face time and other resource constraints. 
Transactions have to be processed in due time to maintain good client relationship and an 
effective running of FIs. There might also be a lack of information available on clients, 
especially in underdeveloped or developing countries where public records might be 
unavailable, inaccessible or disorganised.51 FIs may be understaffed or staffs might lack 
training and facilities, such as the right software, to conduct CDD and EDD to identify high-
risk clients.52  
Moreover, the FATF recommends that countries provide, in their laws or regulations, for 
working definitions of a PEP.53 However, the concept of a PEP does not have only technical 
challenges but is also a politically sensitive issue.54 On the one side, there may be a lack of 
political will to enact specific laws criminalising illegal acts by PEPs; on the other side, FIs 
may face political pressure to ignore the PEP status of a client or they might face possible 
retribution for not accepting a PEP as a client.55 
                                                     
50  Recommendation 18 of the FATF. FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 14. 
51 Patel & Thakkar (2012) 170.  
52  FATF Guidance Paper (2013)  
53 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 13. 
54 Oji (2014) 208. 
55  FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 24. 
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Some scholars have proposed that there be a global and all-inclusive list of PEPs to facilitate 
the identification and risk assessment of PEPs.56 However, this is unlikely to be successful 
and might have more negative consequences than good ones.57 A list of PEPs will inform 
criminals and terrorists of who is corruptible and who is not.58 For example, middle-ranking 
public officials might not appear on the list and criminals or terrorists might opt to bribe 
them and conduct joint operations with them instead of liaising directly with PEPs at higher 
ranks to avoid detection or being identified by FIs. Additionally, creating an all-inclusive list 
might turn the identification of PEPs into a checklist procedure, according to which the 
names of potential or existing clients might be run through the list, and the risk assessment 
might be based solely on the results produced.59  
2.2 Mechanisms of Money Laundering in Relation to PEPs 
Money laundering is a process that involves different mechanisms.60 
2.2.1 Proceeds to be Laundered 
As with any money laundering scheme, the origins of proceeds to be laundered by PEPs is 
the foremost element in the process of money laundering. These proceeds come from the 
predicate offences of money laundering. As mentioned earlier, the scope of these predicate 
offences vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. They include offences such as bribery, grand 
                                                     
56  FATF Report on the Money Laundering Typologies (2003-2004) 22. 
57 Choo (2008) 373. 
58 Choo (2008) 373. 
59 Choo (2008) 373. 
60 Richards (1998) 48. 
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corruption, human trafficking, drugs dealing, trafficking of organs, and tax evasion.61 PEPs 
launder mainly proceeds and corruption and embezzlement,62 including kickbacks from the 
awarding of government contracts and bribes paid in exchange for benefits such as 
obtaining licences, protection against investigations, overlooking of illegal activities, and 
communication of insider information. Some PEPs obtain proceeds also directly from 
national funds through embezzlement. They thus boost their well-being to the detriment of 
the national economy and society. 
2.2.2 Stages of Money Laundering 
Proceeds of crimes undergo a three-stage process: placement, layering and integration.63 
Placement is the first money laundering stage. It consists of moving the proceeds of crimes 
from their original source. They are placed in less suspicious locations, such as formal or 
informal institutions, or retail economies, and are converted into a more portable form.64 
This is a crucial stage as the proceeds are easily traceable by investigators. Hence, this initial 
introduction of the proceeds into the financial system is risky.65 
Cash is placed in financial or non-financial institutions. The money to be deposited in banks 
is split into small amounts which are below the reporting threshold of banks. To avoid 
drawing the attention of authorities, the money is then deposited either by different people 
                                                     
61 Madinger J Money Laundering: A Guide For Criminal Investigators (2011) 13. 
62 Reuter (2004) 41. 
63 Odeh IA Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing for Financial Institutions (2010) 3. 
64 Richards (1998) 48. 
65 Gottschalk P Financial Crime Categories in Investigation and Prevention of Financial Crime: Knowledge 
Management, Intelligence Strategy and Executive Leadership (2016) 20. 
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or at different times into a bank account. Also known as smurfing and structuring, this 
practice came about with the advent of banks’ obligation to report suspicious transactions 
to FIUs.66 Essentially, indirect placements are deposits made into the banking system with 
the help or the use of a third party, a legal or natural person, as a front. For example, front 
companies can be set up, or money can be shifted to life insurances or financial service 
providers, or it can be handed to exchange service providers. For instance, a politician will 
not go to the bank to deposit his illegal cash. He is already under the scrutiny of banks and 
other FIs, as per Recommendations 12 and 22 of the FATF. He will use an intermediary, a 
third party to place the money into the financial system.67 Payments gained in kind are used 
for personal enjoyment or in exchange for legitimate campaign financing.  
Another kind of placement is where the proceeds are used to buy existing banks or to start-
up new banks in offshore countries.68 Yet another kind of placement consists of influencing 
bank employees not to subject direct deposits to scrutiny.69 
Additionally, PEPs (mis)use OFCs, corporate vehicles and intermediaries to launder their 
illicit wealth. For example, there are charges pending against Marie Le Pen, leader of the 
French rightist political party, and her father, Jean-Marie, founder of the same party, for 
alleged laundering through a shell company for purposes of funding political campaigns.70 
                                                     
66 Schneider F & Windischbauer U ‘Money laundering: Some Facts’ 26 (2008) European Journal of Law and 
Economics 394. 
67 FATF Report on the Money Laundering Typologies (2003-2004) 20-21. 
68 Schneider & Windischbauer (2008) 395. 
69 Schneider & Windischbauer (2008) 395. 
70 The Telegraph ‘Panama Papers: David Cameron silent on whether family money remains in Caribbean 
tax shelter’ 4 April 2016.  
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The shell company was set up in the British Virgin Islands. In total, the Le Pens are accused 
of stashing away wealth worth USD 2.3 million in cash, titles and gold bars in offshore tax 
havens.71 The case of Le Pen is a clear example of PEPs using OFCs and corporate vehicles to 
launder money. Moreover, such active steps taken with the intention of hiding or concealing 
money constitute the second stage of money laundering.72 This stage is also known as 
stacking.73 The globalised economy, the removal of barriers to the movement of capital, as 
well as the development of wire transfers and mobile bank transfers have contributed to 
the ease of laundering at this stage. Transaction intensity and transaction speed are 
important for launderers and, with the advent of technology, multiple international 
transfers can be made within seconds.74 The trail of money is disguised in such a way that it 
becomes difficult for investigators to find the source of the money.75 
Converting assets into different forms is also part of the layering process.76 Other financial 
instruments involved in layering schemes include converting the criminal money into 
traveller’s cheques, bearer stocks, letters of credit, money orders and bank drafts.77 
As mentioned earlier, corporate vehicles, intermediaries, such as lawyers, and offshore 
banking operations are the channels used by PEPs to distance themselves from proceeds of 
                                                     
71 International Business Times ‘Panama Papers: France's Le Pen Dynasty, Butlers and Gold Ingots Linked 
To Mossack Fonseca Leak’ 5 April 2016. 
72 Madsen F Transnational Organised Crime (2009) 106. 
73 Schneider & Windischbauer (2008) 394. 
74 Schneider & Windischbauer (2008) 395. 
75 Albrecht W et al Fraud Examination (4 ed) (2011) 593. 
76 Richards (1998) 47. 
77 Madinger (2011) 259. 
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crimes they commit.78 Shell companies are used often to facilitate bribery.79 These shell 
companies have no real business activities and are mostly located in tax havens such as the 
Panama, the Cayman and the British Virgin Islands.80  
Some of the mechanisms mentioned above allow for anonymity, through which PEPs are 
able to hide their ownership and control of corporate vehicles.81 The successful placement 
and integration result in assets that appear legitimate and which can be injected back into 
the mainstream economic system. This is known as the integration stage. The assets appear 
clean and are utilised freely to purchase high-value commodities, or for investment in, for 
example, real estate.82 In order to provide a legal explanation for the assets owned, loan 
documents, and other contracts are created. Additionally, the laundered money can be 
mingled with legitimate money, making it difficult to distinguish between the two. 
Moreover, the laundered assets can be re-invested in criminal enterprises, thereby 
repeating the cycle of criminality.83 Hence, the availability of proceeds and of the laundering 
mechanisms mentioned above create a favourable environment for PEPs to commit money 
laundering.84  
                                                     
78  FATF Guidance Notes 10. 
79 OECD (2001) 21. Gordon (2011) 17. 
80 Gordon (2011) 17-18. 
81 Gordon (2011) 17. 
82 Madsen (2009) 106.  
83 Madinger (2011) 5. 
84 OECD Behind the Corporate Veil Using Corporate Entities For Illicit Purposes (2001) 21. 
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2.3 Anti-Money Laundering Pillars in Relation to Politically Exposed Persons 
2.3.1 Preventive Pillar of the Anti-Money Laundering Regime 
The prevention pillar aims to deter economic criminality. Its key elements are CDD and EDD, 
record keeping, regulation, supervision, and sanctions.  
The FATF recommends that FIs should have enough legal and regulatory measures to deter 
criminals, especially PEPs, and their associates from misusing FIs.85 The required measures 
to be adopted by FIs include the development of internal control policies, and procedures, 
record-keeping, relevant ongoing employee training programme, and the setting up of an 
independent audit function to test the risk management system.86 
The FATF recommends that FIs should take reasonable measures to know the true identity 
of a client.87 CDD entails an assessment of risks associated with a client and the type 
business or transaction he wants to undertake.88 It aims at limiting criminal access to and 
the misuse of the FIs. The FATF states that national laws should prescribe how FIs should 
conduct CDD. It lists also four situations in which CDD should be conducted:  
(i) when a business relationship has to be established,  
(ii) when occasional transactions have to be carried out,  
(iii) when suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing have arisen, or  
                                                     
85 Recommendation 18 of the FATF. FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 25. 
86 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 25. 
87 FATF Recommendations 10 of the FATF. 
88 FATF Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10: Customer Due Diligence (2012) 60-68. See generally, 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Customer Due Diligence for Banks (2001). 
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(iv) when the FI has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of documents communicated 
by the client.89 
As CDD does not suffice when dealing with these high-risk clients, and since an individual 
may become a PEP at any point in time,90 EDD should be conducted.91 EDD consists of the 
following measures: it requires senior management approval,92 in-depth enquiry about the 
source of wealth and the source of funds,93 and enhanced ongoing monitoring of the 
business relationship and the PEP status of the existing client.94 
FIs should be obligated to report all irregularities and suspicious transactions identified, 
regardless of the amount involved.95 Indeed, in cases where suspicion arises with regard to a 
potential or existing client or his activities, further investigation should be conducted, and if 
the suspicion is valid the case should be reported to a nominated officer of the institution, 
who is commonly called the ‘money laundering reporting officer (MLRO), or directly to the 
regulatory body.96 An STR must then be sent to the national regulatory or supervisory 
body.97 
                                                     
89 Recommendation 10 of the FATF. 
90 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 7. 
91 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 9, 13, 19, 20 and 22. 
92 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 19-20. 
93 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 20-22. 
94 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 22-23. Recommendation 12 of the FATF. 
95 Recommendations 12 and 20 of the FATF. FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 82. 
96 Hopton (2006) 101. 
97 Recommendations 12 and 20 of the FATF. 
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Theoretically, these steps are straightforward and the procedure seems plausible. However, 
practical difficulties may arise. While, some clients may not produce the necessary 
documents, others may provide documents in a wrong and unacceptable format.98 Also, in 
developing countries, where data is limited or inaccessible, it might be difficult practically 
for FIs to find information about domestic PEPs.99 Moreover, CDD and EDD are time-
consuming procedures which not only entail deploying additional staff and setting up 
compliance department in a company or FI, but can also prove to be a business 
disadvantage as refusing to engage in business with high-risk clients such as PEPs involves a 
high opportunity cost. Because it is ongoing, EDD is a recurrent cost.100 
The keeping of documents is another element of the preventive pillar.101 National laws 
should require FIs to keep all CDD and EDD information, and transaction records for at least 
five years after the business relationship has ended, or after the date of the transaction.102 
Record keeping allows FIs, as well as regulatory and supervisory bodies, to conduct checks 
and controls and ensure compliance with the law and regulations.103  
Furthermore, the FATF calls for the licensing and registration of FIs and their supervision and 
monitoring.104 The supervision and monitoring can be conducted by a supervisor or an 
                                                     
98 Hopton (2006) 91. 
99 Mugurara (2016) 151. 
100 Hopton (2006) 95. 
101 Recommendation 11 of the FATF. 
102 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 15. 
103 Hopton (2006) 97. 
104 Recommendation 26 of the FATF. 
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appropriate self-regulatory body. The FATF highlights that supervisors should be 
empowered to compel FIs to produce information showing how they adhere to compliance 
procedures.105 They should be empowered also impose sanctions on FIs, as well as their 
directors and senior officers for non-compliance with AML/CFT measures.106 These 
sanctions have to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and they can be of criminal, 
civil or administrative nature.107 
2.3.2 Enforcement Pillar of the Anti-Money Laundering Regime 
The Council of Europe was the first regional organisation to focus on money laundering and 
to push for the criminalisation of acts of money laundering, thereby, shifting the AML 
approach from a purely preventive one to a punitive one as well. The main aim of AML 
enforcement measures is to punish offenders who either attempt or succeed in their 
wrongdoing. This occurs when preventive measures have failed. The enforcement aspect of 
AML/CFT has four elements: 
(i) the listing of predicate crimes, 
(ii) investigation and prosecution, 
(iii) punishment, and  
(iv) confiscation.108 
                                                     
105 Recommendation 26 of the FATF. 
106 Recommendation 35 of the FATF. 
107 See Recommendations 6, 8 to 23, 17, and 35 of the FATF.  
108 Reuter (2004) 46. 
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As mentioned earlier, money laundering springs from the commission of a predicate 
offence.109 The Vienna Convention has a restrictive approach to the definition of predicate 
offences. However, the Palermo Convention promotes an extended range of predicate 
offences. What is more, unlike the Vienna Convention, UNCAC calls upon states parties to 
adopt an extended range of predicate offences for money laundering while, at a minimum, 
recognising the eight crimes for which it provides.110 The Council of Europe Convention joins 
other international instruments in regard to its scope of predicate offences, and extends 
them to ‘any criminal offence’.111 The FATF recommends that countries include the widest 
range of predicate offences.112 As mentioned earlier,113 the predicate offence of money 
laundering committed by PEPs includes mainly the crimes of bribery and corruption. Hence, 
the FATF also focuses on the responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative 
authorities, in particular anti-corruption authorities with enforcement powers. They should 
be empowered to investigate money laundering and terrorist financing offences arising 
from, or related to, corruption offences under Recommendation 30 of the FATF.114 
Since the 1990s, different legal instruments and regulatory frameworks have been 
developed in relation to money laundering. The FATF recommends that countries should 
criminalise money laundering on the basis of the Vienna Convention and the Palermo 
                                                     
109 See section 1.1 of Chapter One. 
110 Article 23(2)(a)-(b) of UNCAC. 
111 Pieth (2004) 14. 
112 See generally FATF Interpretive Note to Recommendation 3 (Money Laundering Offence) (2012) 34-35. 
113 See section 2.2.2.2 of Chapter Two. 
114 See generally FATF Interpretive Note to Recommendation 30: (Responsibilities of Law Enforcement and 
Investigative Authorities) 100-101. 
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Convention.115 Essentially, the Vienna Convention was the first international instrument 
adopted for the regulation of money laundering and the recovery of unlawful assets. But 
this Convention focused on prohibitions aimed at controlling narcotic drugs trafficking and 
did not refer to the term money laundering. The Palermo Convention obligates state parties 
to criminalise the laundering of proceeds of all serious crimes.116 Unlike the Vienna 
Convention, the Palermo Convention uses the term money laundering.117 Neither the 
Vienna Convention nor the Palermo Convention specifically mentions PEPs. Nevertheless, 
the latter incorporates corruption-related crimes. It is submitted that, as an organised crime 
and as one of the serious crimes, corruption also falls within the ambit of predicate offences 
under the Palermo Convention. Thus, AML measures within this Convention can be said to 
be applicable to PEPs. A similar conclusion can be drawn with reference to a provision of the 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU Convention).118 The 
latter deals with the proceeds of corruption and criminalises the conversion and transfer of 
proceeds of corruption or its related offences for the purpose of concealing or disguising 
their illegal source.119 Finally, as mentioned earlier, UNCAC criminalises also money 
laundering. In fact, the initial title of Chapter V of the Draft Convention was “Preventing and 
Combating the Transfer of Funds of Illicit Origin Derived from Acts of Corruption” implying 
the laundering of funds and returning of such funds.120 
                                                     
115 Recommendation 3 of the FATF. 
116 Article 5 of the Palermo Convention. 
117 Article 6 of the Palermo Convention. 
118 The AU Convention was adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 2006. 
119 Article 4(1) (h), Article 6, and Article 7 of the AU Convention.  
120 Travaux Preparatoires UNCAC Chapter V Asset Recovery Notes to the Secretary Para. 2. 
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Not surprisingly, there is a general misconception that PEPs, especially the head of state 
who enjoys immunity during his term of office, is immune from prosecution. The FATF 
highlights that PEPs are not immune. Its Recommendation 12 is applicable to them and they 
are subject to STRs by FIs.121 This is not to say that the immunity provision may retard the 
criminal prosecution and conviction of PEPs. STRs and investigations triggered by them may 
lead to the identification of other persons without immunity who are involved in criminal 
activity, and who could be prosecuted immediately, for example, co-conspirators or 
accomplices). In fact, UNCAC and the AU Convention recognise wide forms of criminal 
participation in the form of assistance, aiding, abetting and counsel of crimes of money 
laundering.122 Hence, in accordance with domestic law, the inchoate crime of attempt may 
also result in criminal liability. The AU Convention, however, is silent on STRs, CDD, tipping 
off, the legal profession’s obligation to combat money laundering, and on the special 
category of launderers, namely, PEPs. 
The FATF recommends the establishment of independent FIUs, which is another element of 
the enforcement pillar. However, it does not specify a particular model that member states 
should adopt.123 It leaves it to the discretion of the member states to choose which model 
suits their jurisdiction best. The FIU plays an important role in the investigation of cases of 
money laundering. It receives STRs and other documents, such as cash transaction reports 
and wire transfers reports, as required by national legislation.124 The FATF encourages FIUs 
                                                     
121 FATF Guidance Paper (2012) 25. 
122 Article 4(1) (h) of the AU Convention. 
123 Recommendation 29 of the FATF. 
124 Recommendation 20 of the FATF. 
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to use analytical software to carry out in-depth investigations and operational and strategic 
analyse. While the latter consists of identifying trends and patterns, the former uses 
information to identify specific persons, assets, criminal networks and associations. The 
information obtained is disseminated to other state entities to identify threats and 
vulnerabilities, and to establish policies and goals for the FIU.  
In fact, for the effective investigation of cases involving PEPs, FIUs should be completely 
independent and autonomous and should have discretion and access to privileged 
information without, for example, encountering barriers of bank secrecy.125 Their 
independence and autonomy allow for the prosecution and punishment of PEPs without 
political interference. Additionally, sensitive information from FIs and investigations should 
be secured and confidentiality should be maintained to the greatest extent necessary so as 
not to notify suspected offenders and to prevent them from layering their assets or fleeing a 
jurisdiction.  
Moreover, countries should provide FIUs with adequate financial, skilled human and 
advanced technical and technological resources to execute their mandate effectively. 
Furthermore, the FATF states that countries should ensure that their national FIU is in line 
with the policies of the Egmont Group, which set out important guidelines concerning the 
role and functions of FIUs, and the mechanisms for exchanging information among them. 
National FIUs should also apply for membership of the Egmont Group.126 Finally, FIUs should 
                                                     
125 The FIU should respond to information requests from competent authorities. In order to fulfil its 
mandate, FIUs should have the power and discretion to ask and receive additional information for 
investigation and analysis. Bank secrecy and information obtained by CDD or KYC under 
Recommendations 10, 11 and 22, as well as information from other sources should be accessible to FIUs 
under Recommendation 31. See FATF Interpretive Notes (2012). 
126 See generally Interpretive Note to Recommendation 29 (Financial Intelligence Units). 
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be able to communicate and engage independently with other domestic and foreign 
authorities to exchange information, especially in cases where FPEPs are concerned. 
Asset tracing, seizure, confiscation and recovery of proceeds of crime are yet another 
element of the enforcement.127 Competent authorities who are investigating investigate on 
money laundering cases arising from, or related to, corruption offences under 
Recommendation 30, should be given sufficient powers to identify, trace, and initiate 
freezing and seizing of assets.  
PEPs who enrich themselves illegally owe a debt to society as their enrichment is 
detrimental to the public good. Therefore, it is essential that assets obtained illegally should 
be recovered and given to the victim society. What bears mentioning is that in most cases 
the money moves from developing to developed countries. With this fact in mind, at the 
negotiations leading up to the adoption of UNCAC, the developing countries insisted that 
provision is made for asset recovery.128 As it stands, UNCAC stipulates that the stolen or 
laundered money should be returned to the legitimate owner.129 However, such measures 
should be applied without violating third party interests and must be applied in good 
faith.130 States in which the assets are located may request a court to hand down a final 
judgment before returning the assets to the true owners.131 The FATF recommends that 
                                                     
127 StAR ‘Tracking Anti-Corruption and Asset Recovery Commitments’. See Ivory R Corruption, Asset 
Recovery, and the Protection of Property in Public International Law (2014) 28. See generally FATF Best 
Practices on Confiscation (Recommendations 4 and 38) (2012). 
128 King C & Walker C Dirty Assets: Emerging Issues in the Regulation of Criminal and Terrorist Assets (2016). 
129 Article 57(2) of UNCAC. 
130 Article 55(3)b of UNCAC. 
131 Article 57(3)(a) of UNCAC. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 46 
 
countries implement measures to identify, trace and evaluate the property that is subject to 
confiscation.132 They should consider also incorporating non-conviction-based confiscations 
in their domestic law.133 This practice is especially helpful in cases where PEPs are involved 
as some of them might enjoy domestic immunity from criminal proceedings.134 What is 
more, unlawfully obtained money does not always return to the country where the crime 
was committed. Money laundering itself, more specifically money laundering by PEPs, 
involves many jurisdictions. Hence, in order to combat money laundering by PEPs 
effectively, mutual legal assistance or international co-operation is essential. The Vienna 
Convention,135 the Palermo Convention,136 and Council of Europe Convention137 encourage 
transnational co-operation. Moreover, the FATF recommends that countries should take 
adequate measures to foster international co-operation.138 
Finally, assets declaration and laws on illicit enrichment contribute to the success of asset 
recovery.139 If assets of PEPs are already declared, any unusually dramatic change in their 
pool of assets is easily traceable. The illegally obtained money that the PEP is laundering or 
has already laundered can be returned to the public purse. Hence, in addition to all the 
                                                     
132 Recommendation 4 of the FATF. 
133 FATF Best Practices on Confiscation (2012) 6-7. 
134 FATF Guidance Paper (2012) 25. 
135 Article 7 of the Vienna Convention. 
136 Article 7(1)(b) of the Palermo Convention. 
137 Pieth (2004) 14. 
138 Recommendations 36-40 of the FATF. FATF Best Practices on Confiscation (2012) 3 -5. 
139 Arnone M & Borlini LS Corruption: Economic Analysis and International law (2014) 510. 
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previous measures discussed above, including CDD, EDD, and the RBA, states are required 
also to obligate PEPs to declare their assets as public officials.140  
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
To sum up here, the concepts of money laundering and PEPs have been well explored by 
literature. Various factors, such as the social and cultural environment, the legal system, and 
political will, create different approaches to these concepts. Nevertheless, risks arising from 
PEPs are a scourge to all societies and to the global economy. Different legal instruments 
and regulatory frameworks have been developed in relation to money laundering. Working 
definitions have been adopted in harmony with international standards. The AML/CFT 
regime stipulates specific prevention measures and enforcement measures. 
 
                                                     
140 Article 52(1) and (5) of UNCAC. FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 11, 16, 17 and 18. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CASE OF MAURITIUS 
 
3.1 Country Facts 
Mauritius is a small Sub-Saharan African country of roughly 1.3 million people, located in the 
Indian Ocean. It gained independence in 1968 and became a Republic in 1992.1 Colonised by 
the Dutch, the French and the British successively, Mauritius inherited a hybrid legal system 
of English common law and French civil law.2 The country has abided by the rule of law 
successfully and the state is run according to the doctrine of separation of powers,3with the 
Queen’s Privy Council as its highest court of appeal.4 The country has a Prime Minister as 
head of state and a President with a mostly, if not entirely, ceremonial position.5 
The Mauritian society is multicultural and has four main ethnic groups: the Hindus (50 
percent), the general population (32 percent), the Muslims (17 percent), and the Sino-
Mauritians (1 percent).6 
                                                     
1 Seetah K ‘Our Struggle’ Shima: The International Journal of Research into Island Cultures 4 (2010) 100. 
2 Country Watch 2015 Country Review: Mauritius 51. 
3 Zafar A ‘Mauritius: An Economic Success Story’ in Chuhan-Pole P & Angwafo M Yes Africa Can: Success 
Stories From A Dynamic Continent’ (2011) 91. 
4 Country Watch Review (2015) 51. 
5 Bunwaree S & Kasenally Political Parties and Democracy in Mauritius (2005) 6-9. 
6 World Bank Group Mauritius: Systematic Country Diagnostic Report (2015) 7. 
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By diversifying its economic activities, Mauritius defied Meade’s prediction of economic 
failure and experienced ‘an economic miracle’.7 The country derives its income from tourism 
as well as from the thriving information and communication technology sector.8  
Interestingly, Mauritius is reliant on its financial institutions to boost its economy. Its gross 
domestic product (GDP) was worth USD 11.68 billion in 2015 and was expected to increase 
throughout 2016.9 The government offers free health care,10 free education and free 
transport for primary to tertiary level students,11 and free transport for people above 60 
years.12 
To sum up here, Mauritius has social, political and economic stability, and a democratic legal 
and judicial system.13 
3.2 The Financial Sector 
As mentioned above, the financial sector is a major pillar of the Mauritian economy. The 
liberalisation and market deregulation of the 1990s, double taxation agreements, and 
investment promotion and protection agreements signed since then, led to the booming of 
                                                     
7  Zafar (2011) 91. 
8 Zafar (2011) 92. 
9 The World Bank ‘Mauritius’. 
10 World Bank Group Report (2015) 49-51. 
11 World Bank Group Report (2015) 55-58. 
12 World Bank Group Report (2015) 83. 
13 See generally World Bank Group Report (2015). See also HRDC A Study on Labour Shortage in the 
Financial Intermediation Sector in Mauritius (2012) 1. 
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this industry.14 Moreover, the legal profession was liberalised to facilitate setting up of 
foreign law firms in the country so that they could provide, in collaboration with 
accountants and other consultants, professional advice and services to both the domestic 
and offshore global business community.15 
The OFC is becoming the regional financial centre of Africa.16 In 2012, the financial sector 
made up 9 percent of the GDP for the year and employed over 13 400 people (around 3 
percent of the total labour force).17 Currently, the Mauritian OFC represents over half of the 
Mauritian banks’ deposit and loan books.18 It has attracted more than 32 000 offshore 
entities, especially those linked to India, South Africa and China.19 
In fact, Mauritius provides global business services, such as investment funds, investment 
holding, asset management, and other collective investment schemes and vehicles, thereby 
facilitating the incorporation and management of mutual funds, trusts, private equity 
vehicles, and other special purpose vehicles.20 There were 21, 606 global business 
companies registered in Mauritius in 2015.21 It bears noting that the corporate vehicles and 
intermediaries that allow for anonymity and instruments such as bearer shares, nominee 
                                                     
14 As at 2014, Mauritius had signed and ratified 37 double taxation agreements with both developed and 
emerging economies. See Board of Investment Mauritius International Financial Sector (2014) 18. 
15 Board of Investment (2014) 16. 
16 World Bank Group Report (2015) 85. 
17 See generally HRDC (2013). 
18 World Bank Group Report (2015) 85. 
19 Country Watch Review (2015) 77. 
20 Board of Investment (2014) 10. 
21 World Bank Group Report (2015) 86. 
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shareholders, and nominee directors and corporate directors or trustees are not allowed in 
the Mauritian financial sector.22  
Statistics from the Financial Services Commission (FSC) show that there has been an 
increase of 6 percent in the financial performance of financial services sector from 2014 to 
2015.23 The average score of business confidence in Mauritius has increased from an 
average of 87 in 2015 to 95 for 2016.24 Moreover, Mauritius ranks best in the African region 
for ease of doing business.25 It also scores well in the Transparency International Corruption 
Index, occupying rank 49, with number 1 being the least corrupt country and number 167 
the most corrupt one.26 Furthermore, the country has ranked first, for nine consecutive 
years, in the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance,27 with a score of 79.9 in 2015, which 
is almost 70.0 points more than Africa’s weakest governance performer at 10.6.28 The OECD 
evaluates Mauritius as being “largely compliant” with global tax laws.29 The latest FATF 
evaluation deemed that the country is compliant with five and largely compliant with 18 of 
the FATF Recommendations. It is partially compliant with three of the six core 
Recommendations.30 It is worth noting that positive changes have been brought to the 
                                                     
22 KnowYourCountry ‘Mauritius’. 
23 Financial Services Commission Launch of the Annual Statistical Bulletin (2016) 18-20. 
24 TradingEconomics ‘Mauritius Business Confidence’. 
25 The World Bank ‘Doing Business Measuring Business Regulations’. 
26 Transparency International 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index (2016). 
27  Mo Ibrahim Foundation Report (2016). 
28 Mo Ibrahim Foundation Report (2016). 
29  AXIS ‘OECD Report 2013: Mauritius Largely Compliant’.  
30 See generally FATF Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (2008). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 52 
 
AML/CFT regime since the last FATF evaluation. New laws, such as the 2015 Good 
Governance and Integrity Reporting Act, have been enacted and guidelines, such as the 
2016 Guidelines on Gifts and Gratifications for Public Officials, have been issued. Mauritius 
is also in the good books of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.31 Finally, constant 
improvement of laws and regulations are made to provide sophisticated and secured 
financial services and to boost this sector even more.32 It also bears noting that the 
distinction between the offshore and the onshore was eliminated in 2006.33 There is thus no 
distinction between offshore and onshore banking. 
To sum up, all the factors above are conducive to making Mauritius and its financial sector 
the ideal haven for investors and launderers; thereby increasing money laundering risks it 
faces. 
3.2.1  Money Laundering Risks Faced by the Mauritian Financial System 
The money laundering risks faced by the Mauritian financial sector cannot be 
underestimated. The fact that the country has a buzzing economy, which is constantly 
growing, makes its FIs vulnerable to abuse. For example, the OFC has many small 
participants, which makes them vulnerable to systematic risks, as they might not have 
enough resources to invest in efficient risk management systems.  
                                                     
31 See generally Global Finance Mauritius Mauritius Financial Sector Overview Report (2015).  
32 IMF Country Report: Mauritius (2016) 4 and 10. 
33 Amendments were made to the 2004 Banking Act. Pursuant to that, all banks are governed by a single 
banking licence under the supervision of the Central Bank. See generally Global Finance Mauritius 
Report (2015). 
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Mauritius is cited in the Panama Papers Scandal. On the one hand, these reveal that the 
Mauritian OFC has been used by a Jersey-based oil firm to avoid paying taxes in Uganda.34 
On the other hand, the OFC has been criticised for not being transparent and the names of 
Mauritians have been linked to suspicious transactions.35 Moreover, the Swiss Leaks Global 
Tax Evasion Scandal (Swiss Leaks) rank the country 94th in its list, based on the measurement 
is the amount of money transferred through the banks of countries involved in the global 
tax evasion affair. Shockingly, the Swiss Leaks also reveal that, from 1980 to 2006, 81 clients 
transferred up to USD 141 million through 71 client accounts, which are linked to 210 other 
bank accounts linked to Mauritius. These clients consist of individuals, both nationals and 
foreigners, and offshore firms.36 
These examples evidence cases of ongoing internal, outgoing and incoming money 
laundering through the Mauritian financial system. Indeed, the country’s financial system is 
used to channel money illicitly in and out and through Mauritius. The major predicate 
offences of money laundering in Mauritius include drug trafficking, swindling, aggravated 
larceny, conspiracy, Ponzi schemes and corruption.37 
                                                     
34 BBC ‘Panama Papers: How Jersey-Based Oil Firm Avoided Taxes in Uganda’ 8 April 2016.  
35 Le Mauricien ‘Opération Panama Papers: 30 Mauriciens et 97 Sociétés Clients Cites’ 10 April 2016. 
36 IslandCrisis ‘Mauritius Ranked 94th in Swiss Leaks, the International Fiscal Evasion Affair’ 11 February 
2015. 
37 KnowYourCountry Mauritius Risk & Compliance Report 2014 (2014) 6. 
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3.3 Money Laundering Risks Arising from Politically Exposed Persons  
3.3.1 Definition of PEP  
PEPs are high-risk customers, who are not neglected by the laws and regulations of 
Mauritius. As highlighted by the FATF Recommendations and the provisions of the Vienna 
and Palermo Conventions, PEPs are given particular attention under Mauritian laws and 
regulations. There are specific regulations and procedures to help FIs identify PEPs and 
minimise risks associated with engaging in business with them. Surprisingly, the definition of 
PEP can be found only in the 2005 Bank of Mauritius Guidance Notes on Anti-money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism for Financial Institutions38 (2005 BoM 
Guidance Notes) and the 2012 Code on the Prevention of Money Laundering & Terrorist 
Financing of the Financial Services Commission (2012 FSC Code).39 
PEPs are defined as: 
‘individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions, 
including heads of state or of government, senior politicians, senior government, 
judicial or military officials, senior executives of publicly owned corporations, 
important political party officials, their family members and their close associates.’40 
This definition is close to the one provided by the FATF. Given the social and cultural setting 
of Mauritius, FIs are encouraged to extend the range of PEPs to include family members.41 
In fact, the definition of family members of PEPs comprises their spouses, any partner 
                                                     
38 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.100-6.107A. 
39 Section 5.3.1 of the 2012 FSC Code. 
40 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.100. 
41 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.100A. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 55 
 
considered by national law as being equivalent to a spouse and their children. However, 
spouses or partners of children of PEPs and parents of PEPs need also be taken into 
consideration when determining whether a person is a PEP or not.42 
PEPs can be local or foreign.43 The 2005 BoM Guidance Notes provide a list of DPEPs to help 
FIs with risk management. Accordingly, DPEPs include: 
‘(i) President/Vice President of Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) All members of the National Assembly and the Speaker 
(iii) Chief Judge and Senior Puisne Judges 
(iv) Director of Public Prosecutions 
(v) Attorney General 
(vi) Commissioner of Police/Prison 
(vii) Leaders and Senior Office Bearers of major Political Parties 
(viii) Members of Rodrigues Regional Assembly 
(ix) Governor/Deputy Governors of the Central Bank 
(x) Chairman and Chief Executive Officers of Parastatal Organisations, Independent 
Bodies and State-Owned Enterprises 
(xi) Commissioners of Various Government Bodies 
(xii) Advisor/ Counsellor to Heads of States and Ministers 
(xiii) Head of Mauritian Embassies abroad, Consulates and Diplomats 
(xiv) Mayors and President of District Councils 
(xv) Head of National Secret Services.’44 
                                                     
42 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.100A. 
43 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.100. 
44 2005 BoM Guidance Notes Appendix H. 
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The risks associated with FPEPs differ according to the particular countries they are 
associated with. The risks also differ with the type of business they want to conduct. Many 
foreign investors invest in or through Mauritius; hence, the BoM Guidance Notes calls FIs to 
pay particular attention to FPEPs.45 
As mentioned above, PEPs are at high risk of abusing their public office through the receipt 
of bribes, embezzlement, and the dissemination of insider information, amongst others. 
They may also use entities they own for their own illicit enrichment;46 hence, the scope of 
PEPs under Mauritian regulations goes further to include entities related to PEPs. Entities 
that are 20 percent or more owned or controlled by DPEPs fall under this category. These 
entities expose FIs to equal reputational and/or legal risks as PEPs themselves. However, the 
threshold of 20 percent or more of ownership in an entity has the same effect as thresholds 
for cash transactions have; launderers act slightly below thresholds and do not get caught 
through due diligence measures. Hence, the specification of 20 percent or more ownership 
in the 2005 BoM Guidance Notes limits the scope of PEPs. 
3.3.2 Family Members and Close Associates 
Interestingly, the FATF Mutual Evaluation Report criticised Mauritius for not defining PEPs in 
line with the FATF Recommendations.47 The latter recommends that countries provide for 
working definitions of both the scope of family members and close associates.48 Domestic 
                                                     
45 2005 BoM Guidance Notes paras 6.100 and 6.101. 
46 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.100. 
47 FATF Mutual Evaluation Report (2008) 9-10. 
48 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 13. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
 57 
 
provisions focused only on entities related to PEPs, which could be associated with the 
definition of close associates under the FATF. However, the FATF recommends that the 
category of close associates include people who are socially or professionally connected to a 
PEP. Some examples include known girlfriends, boyfriends, mistresses, prominent members 
of the same political party or organisation as the PEP and business partners or associates, 
especially, those who share beneficial ownership of legal entities with the PEP, or who have 
joint membership on a company board of directors.49 The definition of a PEP at the time of 
the FATF Mutual Evaluation fell short of these criteria. The current definition of PEPs 
includes close associates. However, it does not specify what kind of associates, which means 
that FIs have the discretion of identifying close associates of high-ranked public officials and 
categorising them as PEPs. 
It bears noting that the Mauritian AML/CFT framework does not include, in its definition of a 
PEP, members of religious groups, senior members of political parties and members of the 
Central Bank or of a royal family. The unregulated activities of and financing of religious 
groups and of political parties create an environment for money laundering, especially by 
PEPs, who openly support and who are, in turn, openly supported by major religious groups. 
It is a reminder that, given the socio-cultural demography of the country, religious groups 
have much power in the community and often benefit from unexplained and unjustified 
privileges.  
 
                                                     
49 FATF Guidance Paper (2013) 13. 
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3.3.3 Time Limit of PEP Status 
The 2005 BoM Guidance Notes provide for a time limit for the categorisation of PEPs who 
are entrusted with prominent public functions. PEPs stop being characterised as such one 
year after they leave office.50 The FATF and the Vienna and Palermo Conventions do not 
impose time limits for the categorisation of PEPs. What is more, the Wolfsberg Guidelines 
recommend that former positions and associations of potential or existing clients should not 
be disregarded.51 The provision of the 2005 BoM Guidance Notes goes against the spirit of 
these international instruments. Nevertheless, the Bank of Mauritius (Central Bank) 
specifies that the de-categorisation of PEPs is made after careful consideration by FIs and 
the approval of their senior management.52  
3.3.4 Examples of the Misuse of the Mauritian Financial Sector by Politically Exposed 
Persons 
Many cases involving PEPs have been associated with the Mauritian financial system. An 
example of internal money laundering is the case of the former Prime Minister and former 
leader of the main political party of Mauritius, Dr Navin Chandra Ramgoolam. In 2015, a 
scandal involving him created public outrage in Mauritius. Some 220 million rupees 
(approximately USD 6.4 million) and secret bank documents proving the existence of 
offshore bank accounts were discovered in safes and suitcases at his residence during a 
                                                     
50 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.107A. 
51 Wolfsberg Global Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Private Banking (2012) 5. 
52 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.103. 
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police search. Most of the money seized was in foreign currency.53 This DPEP has had 12 
provisional charges pending against him, including charges of using his public office for 
gratification, money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering.54 
What is more, Dr Ramgoolam’s name appears among those Mauritians linked to the Swiss 
Leaks and he has been accused of fiscal evasion.55 
Ms Nandanee Soornack, a Mauritian businesswoman, is a close friend and known mistress 
of Dr Ramgoolam.56 When the latter was holding office as prime minister, Ms Soornack 
acquired portions of land and ‘des boutiques hors taxe’ at the airport of Mauritius. Her 
growing business and rising career as a businesswoman caused another national uproar.57 
Investigations led to provisional charges of complicity to commit money laundering in the 
cases involving Dr. Ramgoolam and two former deputy commissioners of police being 
preferred against her.58 
Another recent example is that of Rundheersing Bheenick, Governor of the Bank of 
Mauritius and a close associate of Dr Ramgoolam. Members of the Central Crime 
Investigation Division (CCID) raided his residence in 2015. They found confidential and 
                                                     
53 Indo-Asian News Service ‘Britain Urged to Probe Former Mauritius Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam’ 5 
October 2016. 
54 LeDefiMedia Group ‘Preliminary Charges Dropped Against Navin Ramgoolam’ 15 July 2016. Affaire Le 
DefiMedia Group ‘Navin Ramgoolam: Les Charges dans L’affaire Dufry Rayées’ 5 December 2016. 
55 IslandCrisis ‘Mauritius Ranked 94th in Swiss Leaks, the International Fiscal Evasion Affair’ 11 February 
2015. 
56 Lexpress.mu ‘Relations Ramgoolam-Soornack: Les Photos Parlent…’ 17 August 2014. 
57 Le DefiMedia Group ‘Démêlés avec la Justice: Une Seule Accusation Provisoire Demeure Contre Navin 
Ramgoolam’ 06 Décembre 2016.  
58 Le DefiMedia Group ‘En Cour Correctionnelle de Port-Louis: Les Mandats D’arrêt Contre Nandanee 
Soornack Prolongés’ 12 Octobre 2016. 
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controversial bank documents, and foreign currency worth approximately USD one million. 
Mr. Bheenick was taken into custody. There were charges of money laundering, larceny in 
receipt of wages and possession of property by means of a crime, amongst others, pending 
against him.59 His position as a high-ranking official of the Central Bank makes him a PEP. 
Yet another example is the case of the Mauritius Commercial Bank and Pierre-Guy Noël, 
who was accused of plotting with the former bank chief manager, Robert Lesage, to launder 
365 million rupees (approximately USD 10 million). This matter was linked to 881.6 million 
rupees (approximately USD 25 million) that had been embezzled from the National Pensions 
Fund.60 
An example of money laundering through the Mauritian OFC is the matter of 
AgustaWestland. This matter is the biggest corruption scandal after the Bofors Scandal in 
1986 that involved bribes of USD 40 million given to high-ranking Indian officials and 
politicians by a Swedish group engaged in the production of weapons of war. 
AgustaWestland is a multinational company, based in Italy. It specialises in the production of 
civil and military helicopters. This company has allegedly bribed high-ranking officials for 
India to obtain a manufacturing contract for helicopters to be used as transport of Indian 
VVIPs. The proceeds of these bribes have been allegedly channelled through the Mauritian 
global business structure, more specifically, through the company, ML Administrators Ltd 
                                                     
59 MauritiusMag ‘The Ex Prime Minister & Now The Ex Governor Of The Bank Of Mauritius Arrested! Is The 
World Taking Note?’ 22 February 2015. 
60 Lexpress.mu ‘Pierre-Guy Noël Comes Back at the Head of the MCB’ 12 July 2005. 
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(MLAL).61 The file of this matter has been handed over to the FIU for further investigation.62 
It is worth noting that the company’s MLRO has been linked also to money laundering cases 
revealed by the Panama Papers. More interestingly, Mr Fakeermahamod is a political 
activist and is close to the present Prime Minister and to his son, who is the Minister of 
Finance and leader of the ruling political party. Moreover, Mr Fakeermahamod’s name had 
been suggested for the district council elections.63  
This case evidences the negligence and unethical behaviour of directors of FIson behalf a 
director of FIs and MLRO, who have the duty to report suspicious transactions to the FIU or 
any other relevant authority, and not to allow such transactions to be carried out. This 
example shows also how a lack of CDD and EDD can lead to the flow of illicit money through 
the Mauritian OFC. The FSC has ordered sanctions against MLAL, demonstrating how the 
FSC can impose sanctions against companies for non-compliance with regulations and 
guidelines. Moreover, this example raises questions as to the appointment of directors and 
employees of FIs, and to the training of employees, and the company’s internal control and 
risk management system of these FIs. 
Another PEP linked to the Panama Papers is Mr Subhas Chandra Lallah, a politician and ex-
parliamentarian. He is on the list of Master Clients of Mossack Fonseca as the Director of the 
                                                     
61 Le DefiMedia Group ‘Corruption Alléguée: Le Dossier Agustawestland Soumis à la FIU’ 30 May 2016.  
62 Le DefiMedia Group 30 May 2016.  
63 Lexpress.mu ‘Affaire AgustaWestland : La FSC Réclame la Révocation de Shakil Fakeermahamod’ 27 May 
2016.  
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Glasgow Global Fund Ltd PCC – Cell Epsilon, Glasgow Global Fund Ltd PCC – Cell Asian 
Growth, Platinul Assets Pte. Ltd, Automative Ventures Ltd, and Xenon Capital Pte Ltd.64 
Yet another example is that of a former Supreme Court judge, Ronald Kwo Sung Yuen, who 
has also been mentioned in the Panama Papers.65 
Mauritius has laws and regulations that define and regulate PEPs and specify the measures 
FIs should take with regards to them. However, cases examples mentioned above evidence 
how PEPs illicitly channel money in, out and through the Mauritian financial system; thereby 
raising questions about the effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime. 
3.4 Implementation of the Anti-Money Laundering Pillars in relation to Politically Exposed 
Persons in Mauritius 
The 2005 BoM Guidance Notes and the 2012 FSC Code explain the procedures for CDD and 
EDD and highlight the importance of a risk management system.66 They call for the setting 
up of internal controls, the appointment of an MLRO, and highlight the role of management 
and supervisors and the importance of internal auditing in ensuring that these measures are 
implemented effectively. When these preventive measures fail, enforcement laws come 
into play. They criminalise the offence of money laundering and provide for investigative 
and prosecution authorities. Law enforcement helps to trace, seize, confiscate and recover 
                                                     
64 Le Mauricien 10 April 2016. 
65 Le Mauricien 10 April 2016. 
66 See generally Chapter 3: Internal Controls and Money Laundering Reporting Officer of the 2012 FSC 
Code. See also 2005 BoM Guidance Notes paras 6.104 and 6.118 - 6.120. 
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proceeds of crime. A set of laws, regulations and guidelines provide the framework for the 
AML enforcement pillar. 
3.4.1 The Preventive Pillar of the Anti-Money Laundering Regime 
Section 14 of Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2002 (2002 FIAMLA) 
provides for the reporting obligations of banks, cash dealers and members of relevant 
professions or occupations, and other FIs, whenever they come across a suspicious 
transaction. Reporting should be done as soon as practicable, but within 15 working days. 
These suspicious transaction reports should be sent to the FIU.67 In 2014, the FIU received 
173 suspicious transaction reports.68 This number has increased in proportion to the 
development of the financial sector. 
FIs have to establish and verify the true identity of clients and their sources of income and 
wealth, hence the importance of CDD and KYC.69 With regards to PEPs or potential PEP 
clients, FIs are required to use their risk management system and EDD to determine what 
kind of business relationship, if any is to be established.70 Different factors, such as the 
source of wealth, the job status, and the country from which the person is or where an 
entity is established, should be considered when deciding whether or not and what kind of 
relationship is established with a potential client.71 Databases as well as other sources of 
                                                     
67 See generally the FIU’s Suspicious Transaction Report: Guidance Note 3 (2014). See also Chapter 8 of 
the 2005 BoM Guidance Notes. See further Chapter 6 of the 2012 FSC Code. 
68 FIU Annual Report (2014) 8. 
69 2005 BoM Guidance Notes paras 6.24 and 6.27. 
70 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.104. 
71 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.106. 
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information, such as the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, and 
government PEP-lists, should be used.72  The 2005 BoM Guidance Notes also advise FIs to 
use international group networks, such as the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money 
Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) and the FATF black list, to obtain information for conducting 
CDD and EDD.73 
Moreover, since corporate vehicles, such as trusts and offshore companies, allow PEPs to 
juggle with assets in, out and through multiple jurisdictions,74 the 2005 BoM Guidance Notes 
call for scrutiny of these complex structures.75 For example, the establishment of trusts is 
regulated by the 2001 Trusts Act. Interestingly, the establishment of shell companies is 
prohibited and the provision of any correspondent services to businesses involving shell 
financial institutions is also prohibited.76 Nevertheless, the South African telecom giant MTN 
allegedly made unauthorised payments of USD 120 000 to its Dubai branch and this money 
was consequently laundered and transferred to a Mauritian shell company account with 
only a post letter box as company address and no activities or employees.77  
Additionally, since most suspicious transaction reports come from the real estate sector, the 
gambling business and law firms, there is a need to prohibit malpractices within these 
                                                     
72 2005 BoM Guidance Notes paras 6.105 and 6.107. 
73 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.105. 
74 OECD (2001) 21-29. 
75 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.107. 
76 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.94. 
77 The Premium Times ‘Nigerian Senate Hears MTN Allegedly Laundered 12 Billion’ 22 September 2016. 
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sectors. Hence, guidelines have been issued to regulate them and minimise the risks that 
they face. Some of the guidelines issued are: 
o Guidelines for Accountants, Auditors and Member Firms    
o Guidelines for Agent in Land and/or Building or Estate Agency /Land Promoter and 
Property Developer        
o Guidelines for Dealer under the Jewellery Act    
o Guidelines for Gambling Business        
o Guidelines for Law Firms (Law firm, foreign law firm, joint law venture, foreign 
lawyer) 
o Guidelines for Law Practitioners (Barristers, Attorneys, Notaries)  
Furthermore, the regulatory measures highlight the importance of ongoing EDD and record-
keeping.78 Although PEPs are de-categorised one year after they leave office, all 
documentation about their EDD and transactions should be kept.79 This helps in the periodic 
review of PEP clients under the RBA, which is recommended to be conducted every year. 
Section 33 of the 2004 Banking Act prescribes record keeping for a period of at least 7 years 
after the completion of transactions.80 Record keeping helps in audits and investigations by 
the regulatory bodies.81 It allows also for the identification of any unusual features, such as 
                                                     
78 Chapters 4, 6, and 7 of the 2005 BoM Guidance Notes. See also Chapters 6 and 8 of the 2012 FSC Code. 
79 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 6.107A. 
80 See also 2005 BoM Guidance Notes para 7.01. 
81 See generally Chapter 7: Record-Keeping of the 2005 BoM Guidance Notes. 
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demands for secrecy, the use of complex instruments that break audit trails, and regular 
transactions involving large sums or sums just below a typical reporting threshold.82 
Supervision is another key element of the AML prevention pillar. The principal supervisory 
authorities of the financial sector include the BoM and the FSC. On the one hand, the BoM 
exercises supervision over banks, foreign exchange dealers and money-changers by issuing 
AML/CFT guidelines. On the other hand, the FSC regulates the non-banking financial services 
sector that includes management companies, investment businesses and insurance entities. 
The FSC also issues guidelines and codes.83  
Gambling, which is a common practice in the country and which can be used to launder 
money, is also regulated. The Gambling Regulatory Authority regulates practices such as the 
betting on horse races, football matches, and other interactive gambling practices.84  
Other regulators for DNFBPs include the Bar Council for barristers, the Mauritius Law 
Society Council for attorneys, the Attorney-General for law firms, foreign law firms, joint law 
ventures, and foreign lawyers, and the Mauritius Institute of Professional Accountants for 
Professional Accountants and member firm.85 
                                                     
82 2005 BoM Guidance Notes paras 6.104, 6.114 and 7.02. 
83 See section 18(1) of the 2002 FIAMLA. 
84 FIU Annual Report (2014) 14.  
85 FIU Annual Report (2014) 15. 
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The above mentioned regulators have an important role to play in ensuring that internal 
controls and procedures and the activities of FIs and DNFBPs comply with laws, rules, 
regulations and guidelines available. Section 3(2) of the 2002 FIAMLA provides that: 
‘a bank, financial institution, cash dealer or member of a relevant profession or 
occupation that fails to take such measures as are reasonable necessary to ensure 
that neither it nor any service offered by it, is capable of being used by a person to 
commit or to facilitate the commission of a money laundering offence shall commit 
an offence.’ 
Indeed, sanctions may apply in the form of administrative, legal or financial action taken by 
the regulators in the event of non-compliance with obligations to report, to keep records 
and to disclose information requested.86 Non-compliance could also be through negligence, 
omission, or a serious defect in the implementation of codes and guidelines. For example, 
the banking license of a licencee could be revoked or a FI could be fined for non-compliance 
and required to take immediate reformative action. 
To sum up here, the above analysis shows that Mauritius has, to a great extent, 
implemented the key elements of the AML preventive pillar and the FATF 
Recommendations. Nevertheless, the examples mentioned above demonstrate that, despite 
the AML/CFT regime, money laundering, especially by PEPs, continues. 
3.4.2 The Enforcement Pillar of the Anti-Money Laundering Regime 
The AML/CFT regime consists, inter alia, of the following: 
(i) Bank of Mauritius Act 2004 
                                                     
86 See sections 14, 18 and 19 of the 2002 FIAMLA. 
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(ii) Bank Of Mauritius Guidance Notes on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism for Financial Institutions 2005  
(iii) Code on the Prevention of Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing of the Financial 
Services Commission 2012 
(iv) Companies Act 2001 (Corporate and Business Registration Department) 
(v) Dangerous Drug Act 2000 
(vi) Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002 
(vii) Financial Services Act 2007 
(viii) Good Governance and Integrity Reporting Act 2015   
(ix) Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Related Matters Act 2003 
(x) Prevention of Corruption Act 2002 
(xi) Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 
(xii) Suspicious Transaction Report – Guidance Note 3 (2014) 
(xiii) The Insurance (Amendment) Act 2015 
(xiv) Trusts Act 2001 
Mauritius made its first efforts to criminalise money laundering with the enactment of the 
Dangerous Drugs Act (2000 DDA) in 1995. The latter criminalises the laundering of the 
proceeds of drug-related offences. In 2000, the Economic Crime and Anti-Money Laundering 
Act was enacted but was subsequently replaced by the 2002 FIAMLA. In 2001, the country 
followed the international trend and ratified the Vienna Convention on 19 February. It 
ratified also the Palermo Convention on 21 April 2003. Moreover, the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism was ratified on 14 December 2004 
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and came into effect in its entirety through the Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism Act of 2003.  
Section 3 of the 2002 FIAMLA criminalises money laundering and the conspiracy to commit 
such crime. It provides that: 
‘(1) Any person who:  
(a) engages in a transaction that involves property which is, in whole or in part, or 
directly or indirectly represents, the proceeds of any crime; or  
(b) receives, is in possession of, conceals, disguises, transfers, converts, disposes of, 
removes from, or brings into Mauritius any property which is, in whole or in part 
directly or indirectly represents, the proceeds of any crime;  
(c) where he suspects or has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the property is 
derived or realised, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly from any crime, shall 
commit an offence.’ 
The 2002 FIAMLA adopts a threshold approach to predicate offences and all serious 
crimes.87 The 2000 DDA adopts a list approach; hence, crimes related to the illicit trafficking 
in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances are categorised as predicate offences.88 
Section 2 of the 2002 FIAMLA describes assets that can be laundered as: 
‘property of any kind, nature or description, whether movable or immovable, 
tangible or intangible.’ 
The property can be laundered in whole or in part or directly or indirectly. Hence, the 2002 
FIAMLA complies with the provisions of the Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention, 
                                                     
 
87 See generally FATF Mutual Evaluation Report (2008) 34-36. 
88 See drug dealing offences under sections 30, 33, 35, 36, and 38 of the 2000 DDA. 
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and the FATF Recommendations as far as the scope of properties to be laundered is 
concerned.89 
Moreover, the punishment for the crime of money laundering or conspiring to commit same 
is provided for by section 8 of the 2002 FIAMLA. The punishment consists of a fine of up to 
two million rupees (approximately USD 28 500) and imprisonment not exceeding 10 years.  
In fact, investigation is an important element of the enforcement pillar. The FIU is one of the 
primary authorities with investigative powers for cases of money laundering. Part III of the 
2002 FIAMLA provides, inter alia, for the establishment of the FIU, the functions of the FIU, 
the setting up of its board, and the nomination of its director, and sets downs the latter’s 
duties.90 Section 14(1A) of the 2002 FIAMLA compels the FIU to provide feedback in writing 
on reports received from banks, FIs or members of the relevant profession or occupation or 
from a relevant authority.91 Section 13 of the 2002 FIAMLA empowers the Director of the 
FIU to ask for additional information in case of reasonable suspicion of a potential money 
laundering or financing of terrorism offence rising from STRs received.  Commercial banks, 
duly licensed by the Bank of Mauritius send suspicious transaction reports to the FIU 
through the goAML web platform, which is an integrated IT application implemented with 
the support of the government and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
                                                     
89 See section 2 of the 2002 FIAMLA providing further examples that limit the scope of the proceeds of 
crime. 
90 Sections 9-13 of the 2002 FIAMLA. 
91 See also Part V: Provision and Exchange of Information in Relation to Money Laundering and Financial 
Intelligence Information of the 2002 FIAMLA. 
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(UNODC).92 Other stakeholders are also expected to be connected to this system, mainly for 
exchange of information.93 
The Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) is the other primary authority with 
investigative powers for cases of money laundering.94 Section 29 (c) of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 2002 (2002 POCA) provides that the Director of the Corruption Investigation 
Division is responsible for any investigation relating to money laundering referred by the FIU 
to Commission. Moreover, during the course of a police enquiry, the commissioner of police 
may intervene and may, notwithstanding the 2002 FIAMLA, refer the case to ICAC, or 
forthwith notify the FIU.95 ICAC also has prosecutorial powers but can prosecute in money 
laundering cases only with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions and when the 
latter has instituted the case in court.96 
Not surprisingly, since the scope of predicate offences is broad, and the enforcement of the 
AML/CFT regime requires the various units of the criminal justice system to work together, 
the 2002 FIAMLA gives powers of investigation to other authorities, such as the 
Commissioner of Police, the Director of Customs and the Mauritius Revenue Authority.97 For 
example, the FIU has to work closely with the Anti-Drugs and Smuggling Unit of the police 
force, as drug offences are one of the main predicate offences of money laundering in 
                                                     
92 FIU Annual Report (2014) 7. 
93 FIU Annual Report (2014) 6. 
94 Investigation of money laundering cases is one of the functions of ICAC. Section 20(1)o of the 2012 
POCA. 
95 Section 45(2)a and c and (3) of the 2012 POCA. 
96 Section 82 of the 2012 POCA. 
97 FIU Annual Report (2014) 7. 
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Mauritius. The Customs and Excise Department can investigate customs declarations, 
commercial invoices, bills of lading and modes of payment, and provide the relevant 
information and documents to the FIU or the Commissioner of Police for further 
investigation. The FIU has the duty to provide also information to other investigatory 
authorities, for example, when that information is relevant to the functions of supervisory 
activities or when the supervisory authority requests particular information.98 Nevertheless, 
the FIU is the only body in Mauritius that may seek information from overseas FIUs.99 It 
received 66 requests for information exchange from overseas FIUs in 2013 and 44 in 2014, 
whereas 199 requests for information exchange were sent to overseas FIUs in 2013 and 189 
in 2014.100 
Information exchange with authorities overseas also takes place on the basis of MOUs 
signed with them, the mutual assistance relationship and reciprocity established, or the 
membership of the Egmont Group.101 Section 20 of the 2002 FIAMLA empowers the FIU to 
exchange information in relation to money laundering and financial intelligence with foreign 
FIUs or comparable bodies. Thus, the Mauritian framework adheres to the provisions for 
collaboration within domestic institutions and the fostering of transnational co-operation in 
terms of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions and collaboration in line with the Council of 
Europe Convention, and the FATF Recommendations 36-40. 
 
                                                     
98 Section 21 of the 2002 FIAMLA. 
99 Section 20 of the 2002 FIAMLA. 
100 FIU Annual Report (2014) 13. 
101 FIU Annual Report (2014) 13. 
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The Mauritian investigation authorities are known for being free and independent from 
political influence, especially in the African region.102 For example, investigations have been 
conducted against high-ranking public officials, such as the Vice Prime Minister and Minister 
of Finance Mr Pravin Kumar Jugnauth, the former Prime Minister, Dr Ramgoolam, and Mr 
Bheenick, former Governor of the Central Bank, amongst others. Interestingly, much 
criticism has been levelled against the way investigations are carried out. For example, a 
former Assistant Commissioner of Police and former Officer in Charge of the Central 
Criminal Investigations Division was convicted for the offence of bribery by public official. He 
had accepted free accommodation, food and beverages in a reputed hotel while 
investigating crimes that had been allegedly committed in the same hotel.103 
Moreover, recent cases of money laundering involving PEPs have been dismissed in courts 
because of lack of evidence and due to investigations that were not conducted properly. For 
example, the Director of Public Prosecutions dropped 11 of 12 charges against Dr 
Ramgoolam for ‘manque de preuves’ (lack of evidence).104 Another example is the case of 
the Mauritius Commercial Bank and Mr Pierre-Guy Noël. The court could not proceed with 
the trial because of flawed investigatory procedures by ICAC. This ruling was to the 
detriment the National Pensions Fund and the Mauritius Commercial Bank case linked to it, 
in which 881.6 million rupees (approximately USD 25 million) were embezzled. Thereafter, 
                                                     
102 See generally Mujuzi JD ‘Strengthening Democracy through Investigating, Prosecuting And Punishing 
Corruption In Mauritius’ East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights 21 (2015) 324. 
103 Independent Commission against Corruption v. Suneechara Oozageer 2006 INT 190. 
104 Lexpress.mu ‘Raj Pentiah: «Une à Une, Les Charges Contre Ramgoolam Disparaissent Par Manque de 
Preuves»’ 27 November 2016.  
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the board of directors reinstated Mr. Noël as the head of the Central Bank.105 Also, high-
ranking public officials, especially the members of the former government and its financiers, 
have been at the centre of investigations and prosecutions of corruption and money 
laundering cases. Hence, there have been strong criticisms of institutions being involved in 
political vendettas.106 Furthermore, until 2013, only 13 of the 18 cases prosecuted ended 
with a conviction.107 
Confiscation is another important element of the enforcement pillar. Confiscation of 
laundered assets can be either conviction-based or non-conviction based. The legal basis of 
confiscation of tainted assets can be found in the 2002 FIAMLA, 2000 DDA and the 2002 
POCA. 
Section 8(2) of the FIAMLA provides that: 
‘Any property belonging to or in the possession or under the control of any person 
who is convicted of an offence under this Part shall be deemed, unless the contrary 
is proved, to be derived from a crime and the Court may, in addition to any penalty 
imposed, order that the property be forfeited.’ 
Section 45(1) of the 2000 DDA states that when a person is charged provisionally or formally 
for drug offences under its Section 30 or money laundering offences under its Section 39: 
‘the Court shall order that the person charged shall not dispose of any of his assets 
or make any withdrawals from any account or deposit at any bank or financial 
institution until:  
(a) he shall have been acquitted of that offence;  
                                                     
105 Lexpress.mu ‘Pierre-Guy Noël Comes Back at the Head of the MCB’ 12 July 2005. 
106 KnowYourCountry ‘Mauritius’. 
107 KnowYourCountry ‘Mauritius’. 
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(b) if convicted of the offence, the Supreme Court shall have made or refused to 
make an order under subsection (10);108 or  
(c) the Court shall have, on good cause shown, revoked or modified its order under 
this subsection.’ 
 
Section 82(4) of the 2002 POCA stipulates that:  
‘Where a person is convicted of an offence under this Act or Part II of the Financial 
Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002, the Court may, in addition to any 
penalty imposed, order the forfeiture of the property the subject-matter of the 
offence.’ 
The onus of proof, which is normally on the State, is on the convicted person. The reversed 
burden of proof implies that the convicted person should establish that his or her 
possessions are not the proceeds of crime. Until the FATF evaluation report, no assets had 
been successfully confiscated. 
Moreover, the 2011 Asset Recovery Act enables the state to recover assets that are 
proceeds or instrumentalities of crime. It can be conviction-based or non-conviction-based 
recovery, that is, it applies to cases where a person has been convicted of an offence and 
also to those cases where there has been no prosecution but it can be proved on a balance 
of probabilities that the property represents proceeds of an unlawful activity.109 The 2011 
Asset Recovery Act has retrospective application and relates to proceeds obtained from 
unlawful activities committed not earlier than 10 years before the commencement of the 
                                                     
108 Section 45(10) of the 2000 DDA provides: Where the Supreme Court finds that the possessions of the 
convicted person or of any member of his family or any part thereof are the proceeds of unlawful 
dealing in dangerous drugs by the convicted person, the Supreme Court shall order the forfeiture of 
those possessions. 
109 See generally Part III – Conviction-Based Asset Recovery and Part IV – Civil Asset Recovery of the 2011 
Asset Recovery Act. 
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Act.110 The offences include drug offences, all offences against the Mauritian laws that are 
punishable with a maximum term of imprisonment of not less than 12 months, and any 
offence committed in a foreign state which, if committed in Mauritius, would have 
constituted an offence under domestic law.111 
The recently enacted 2015 Good Governance and Integrity Reporting Act is an example of 
active steps taken by the government to indirectly combat money laundering by PEPs. This 
piece of legislation criminalises illicit enrichment, especially by public officials, and thus 
helps in the combat against money laundering and financing of terrorism. 
Finally, for the authorities to enforce AML/CFT measures, co-operation, information 
exchange, and assistance between institutions and regulatory authorities are indispensable. 
The Mauritian AML/CFT framework ensures collaboration between its institutions. Part V of 
the FIAMLA contains measures for the provision and exchange of information in relation to 
money laundering and financial intelligence information. Part IV establishes a committee, 
named the National Committee for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism. It consists of representatives of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Attorney 
General, the Registrar of Associations, directors of the FIU and representatives of the 
Mauritius Revenue Authority, the Commissioner of Police, and other persons deemed to 
have special knowledge of or experience in AML/CFT matters.  
                                                     
110 Section 2 of the 2011 Asset Recovery Act. 
111 Section 2 of the 2011 Asset Recovery Act. 
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3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has given an overview of Mauritius and its financial system. It has established 
the money laundering risks the country faces. It has also explained the definition of a PEP, 
and how PEPs (mis)use the Mauritian financial system to launder proceeds of crime. 
Examples of known cases have been given. Finally, the implementation of the AML/CFT 
pillars, and the legal and regulatory measures in Mauritius, in so far as they apply to PEPs, 
have been examined and evaluated against the template of international standards. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Money laundering has a negative impact on society, the reputation and development of 
countries and, ultimately, on the global economy. Money laundering by PEPs is a 
widespread international concern. PEPs divert government funds into their own pockets. 
They also enrich themselves with the proceeds of corruption.  
Since money laundering techniques keep on changing, the AML/CFT pillars are in constant 
evolution too. However, the amount of IFFs in the global economy and scandals, like the 
Panama Papers Scandal and Wiki Leaks reflect the scourge of money laundering, particularly 
by PEPs. What is more, money laundering occurs mostly in stable jurisdictions and tax 
havens like Mauritius and it affects developing countries more negatively than developed 
countries. 
This research paper has explored the preventive and the enforcement pillars while 
highlighting the measures recommended by the FATF and those instituted by FIs to 
minimise the money laundering risks posed by PEPs. This paper has studied also the extent 
to which the AML/CFT pillars are being implemented in relation to PEPs in Mauritius. 
4.2 General Conclusions 
Generally, it can be concluded that: 
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 International instruments such as the FATF Recommendations, the Basel Principles, 
UNCAC, the AU Convention, the Vienna Convention and the Palermo Convention 
provide for a robust international AML/CFT regime. In fact, since the 1990s, 
preventive measures have been designed, to deter launderers and detect attempts 
to launder money, whereas enforcement measures have been designed for the 
criminalisation, investigation, prosecution, and punishment of money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism. Enforcement consists also in seizing, freezing, confiscating 
and recovering the proceeds of the predicate crimes committed. However, in 
practice, implementation is lax, especially in relation to PEPs. This is reflected in the 
extent to which the phenomenon of IFFs and the number of PEP-related money 
laundering scandals manifest in practice. 
 The concepts of money laundering and the PEP are ambiguous. An analysis of the 
AML/CFT legal international frameworks and the literature surveyed shows that 
there is no universal definition of the concepts of money laundering and the PEP, 
and consequently, there has been an uneven criminalisation of PEP conduct in the 
various jurisdictions. These differences are reflected in the provisions of both the 
preventive and enforcement laws, thus affecting deterrence, transnational 
investigation, and co-operation in dealing with money laundering cases involving 
PEPs. 
 The FATF Recommendations, which are soft laws enforced through mutual 
evaluation reports and peer pressure, provide for extensive AML/CFT measures, 
especially in regard to PEPs. The FATF provides guidance and support also for 
countries in need, and black lists non-compliant countries; 
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 The extended definition of PEPs, as set out in the Wolfsberg Principles and  which 
requires members of religious groups, political parties and royal families, and those 
employed by supranational organisations and central banks to be categorised as 
PEPs, is not a popular requirement or recommendation among other international 
standard setters, such as the FATF. 
 CDD and EDD are practised as a mere regulatory obligation and employees tend to 
apply these measures by going through a checklist. What is more, the top 
management personnel of some financial services providers take high risks to 
achieve their targeted growth and profit margin, and accept PEPs as clients. These 
PEPs seize the opportunity and use of financial intermediaries and corporate vehicles 
hide their identity. 
4.3. Specific Conclusions 
More specifically, this paper concludes that: 
 The Mauritian laws and regulatory framework provide extensively for the combating 
of the crime of money laundering. It is unfortunate that money laundering by PEPs is 
not criminalised under the 2002 FIAMLA. 
 There has been significant progress in the Mauritian AML/CFT legal regulation since 
the last FATF mutual evaluation report. Guidelines issued by the Central Bank and 
regulations and codes published by supervisory and regulatory bodies have been on 
the increase in Mauritius. 
 Novel AML/CFT preventive and law enforcement measures, for example, the 2011 
Asset Recovery Act, the 2015 Good Governance and Integrity Reporting Act and the 
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BoM Guideline on Corporate Governance have been implemented to re-enforce the 
Mauritian AML/CFT regime and to create a safer and more secure financial sector.  
 The supervisory and regulatory bodies are well structured and have powers 
enshrined in the law. They work in collaboration with other law enforcement 
authorities which are also empowered to investigate and are required by law to pool 
their resources in anti-money laundering cases. The essential co-operation and 
assistance to fight money laundering is ensured also by the National Committee for 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, which has a set 
structure and a specific mandate. 
 Mauritius co-operates with other FIUs and relevant authorities in matters of money 
laundering and related offences. In fact, the country is a signatory to the Vienna 
Convention and the Palermo Convention, and is a member of international anti-
money laundering bodies such as the Egmont Group, the Wolfsberg Group of Banks 
and the Basel Committee. Importantly, even though it is not a member of the FATF, 
Mauritius subscribes to the standards set by the FATF and it has also provisions 
which ensure transnational co-operation in AML/CFT cases. 
 Mauritius has a regulated financial sector which, in spite of the existing AML/CFT 
structure, still is vulnerable to being exploited by money launderers. This is borne 
out by the cases described above. 
 Mauritius has no law regulating money value transfer operators. This is a serious 
deficit, as it undermines other AML/CFT initiatives. 
 The time limit prescribed for the de-categorisation of PEPs is one year after they 
leave office. This short time span puts the Mauritian financial sector at risk of being 
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misused by PEPs, quite apart from the fact that it runs counter to the spirit of FATF 
standards. 
 Despite having guidelines and codes regulating secretive corporate vehicles and 
financial intermediaries, these are implemented only in a casual manner which, of 
course, defeats the purpose for which they were issued. 
 With a mandate to create more employment, increase foreign direct investment, 
and achieve economic growth, the Mauritian government has devised a new scheme 
allowing foreigners who invest in high-value real estate in Mauritius to obtain 
permanent residence. This magnanimous overture increases the risks of misuse of 
the financial sector and encourages criminals to launder their money in and through 
Mauritius. 
 The definition of a PEP in the Mauritian AML/CFT framework lacks scope as it does 
not include members of religious groups, senior members of political parties and 
members of the Central Bank or of a royal family. The unregulated activities and 
financing of religious groups and of political parties create an environment for 
money laundering, especially by PEPs who openly support and who are, in turn, 
openly supported by major religious groups. Given the socio-cultural demography of 
the country, religious groups wield much power in communities and often benefit 
from unexplained and unjustified privileges. 
 The definition of PEPs does not devote equal attention to DPEPs, FPEPs, and FPEPs of 
international organisations. 
 Small companies in the offshore industry lack the resources to allocate to their 
internal AML/CFT policies and measures. What is more, unlike banks licensed by the 
BoM, other financial services providers are not required, but only encouraged, by 
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regulators to have the goAML software and to submit suspicious transaction reports 
to the FIU through the web. 
 There is a lack of expertise and efficiency in both law enforcement and the judiciary 
when it comes to dealing with money laundering cases. Furthermore, there is a great 
discrepancy between the number of suspicious transactions reported and the 
investigations initiated, let alone the number of prosecutions instituted and the 
incidence of convictions. 
 Investigations on economic crimes involving Mauritian DPEPs are motivated not so 
much by the will to eradicate crime as the desire to carry out personal vendettas. 
Indeed, after the past two elections, investigations were carried out against PEPs 
associated with the losing party, and incriminating information was propagated 
which implicated certain politicians, resulting in party members joining the rival 
party. 
4.4 Recommendations 
1. The concepts of a PEP and money laundering need to be defined more evenly by the 
different international instruments and in different jurisdictions. In Mauritius, the definition 
of a PEPs should be extended to include senior members of religious groups and FPEPs of 
international organisations. 
2. Amendments to the FIAMLA 2002 need to criminalise money laundering and impose 
stiffer penalties, especially with regard to PEPs holding public office. 
3. There needs to be increased transparency in the screening of cases to be investigated by 
law enforcement authorities and cases to be prosecuted by the DPP. 
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4. Public awareness on the harmful effects of money laundering on the economy needs to 
be stepped up considerably. At present, there is little evidence of this happening. Moreover, 
financial services providers need to acquaint their employees more thoroughly with the 
ploys used by money launderers. Training and upskilling of employees therefore need to 
constitute one of the main pillars of effective AML/CFT policies. 
5. Financial service providers need to be assisted by the FIU and law enforcement 
authorities in making more effective use of the goAML web platform to detect and report 
suspicious transactions. 
6. It does not suffice merely to have laws governing corporate vehicles, financial 
intermediary, and investment facilities. What is needed is a rigorous, practical 
implementation of the provisions. Unless this is done, much of the efforts devoted to 
AML/CFT will continue to be undermined. 
7. In order to ensure that PEPs do not exploit the influence they still exert after vacating 
office, it is necessary that the categorisation of a PEP cover should be extended to more 
than one year after the PEP has ceased to hold public office. 
8. Criminal justice researchers in Mauritius need to devote greater attention to studying 
why a discrepancy exists between the incidence of suspicious transactions reported and the 
incidence of investigations and prosecutions initiated. Empirical studies on this 
phenomenon would shed light on where and why hiccups in the system occur. Pinpointing 
the weak linkages in the chain would help the criminal justice authorities to locate the 
causes of the disproportionality between reporting, investigation, prosecution and 
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conviction of money launderers. This insight would lead to effective improvements in the 
AML/CFT legal regime. 
9. Informal banking systems and money value transfer operators need to be regulated as a 
matter of urgency, for no one knows to what extent this sector of the economy is presently 
being exploited for money laundering purposes. 
10. The present state of affairs, according to which economic crimes such as money 
laundering and corruption are dealt with by the ordinary criminal courts, does not help to 
focus and to capacitate prosecutors and judges to deal with economic crimes of this nature. 
There is therefore a need to create a specialised division of the high court to deal with 
economic crimes. Such an initiative will reinforce the effort to deal more aggressively with 
the scourge of money laundering. 
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